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UNICORN STOCK OPTIONS—GOLDEN 
GOOSE OR TROJAN HORSE? 
Anat Alon-Beck* 
Large privately held startups valued at $1 billion or more 
(“unicorns”) are grappling with how to deal with employees’ 
expectations caused by the illiquidity of the shares of stock 
acquired upon exercise of their options. Until about eight years 
ago, many talented workers chose to work for a startup 
company for a lower cash salary combined with a substantial 
stock option grant and the dream of cashing out for a large 
sum of money after an initial public offering (“IPO”) of the 
startup’s stock.  
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Today, unicorns remain private for extended periods of 
time, in part, because they are often no longer dependent on an 
IPO or a trade sale to raise sufficient capital. As a result, they 
are delaying liquidity events for their founders, employees, and 
investors, thereby causing their employee stock options to lose 
some of their allure as a hiring and retention device.  
This Article examines a contemporary puzzle in Silicon 
Valley: Is there a shift in unicorn employees’ expectations that 
results in labor contract renegotiations? To answer this 
question, this Article explores the challenges faced by unicorn 
firms as repeat players in competitive technology markets and 
offers the following possible solutions. First, it proposes new 
equity-based compensation contracts, and critiques them. 
Second, it suggests alternatives to the traditional liquidity 
mechanisms, and critiques them. Unfortunately, current 
securities and tax laws create legal barriers to private 
ordering, which prevent the parties from solving these issues 
on their own. This Article concludes with proposals to remove 
these legal barriers to private ordering to allow for the 
proposed solutions to take hold, accompanied with new 
mandatory disclosure requirements to limit the risks.  
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“[W]e have thousands of employees that own stock 
[who gave] their blood, sweat, and tears to make Uber 
a great company. . . . I say we are going to IPO as late 
as humanly possible. It’ll be one day before my 
employees and significant others come to my office 
with pitchforks and torches.” 
– Travis Kalanick, former CEO of Uber1 
 
 
1 Sam Shead, Uber’s CEO Says He’s Leaving It ‘As Late as Humanly 
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“One of the many tradeoffs that early startup 
employees choose to make is between cash, and 
options. For some employees, however, this may end 
up being a Faustian bargain of sorts.” 
– Scott Kupor, managing partner of Andreessen 
Horowitz2 
I. INTRODUCTION: NEW “TECH BUBBLE” 
PUZZLE 
With the declining U.S. market for initial public offerings 
(“IPOs”),3 caused in part by the availability of new private 
capital sources,4 there has been a corresponding rise in the 
 
2 Scott Kupor, The Lack of Options for (Startup Employees’) Options, 
ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ (June 23, 2013), https://a16z.com/ 
2016/06/23/options-timing/ [https://perma.cc/ZZ3D-V4TQ]. 
3 The decline in IPOs has gained attention from the media, 
policymakers, and academics. See Oversight of the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & 
Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 39–41 (2017) (statement of Jay Clayton, 
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission); Elisabeth de Fontenay, 
The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public Company, 
68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 454–55 (2017); Adley Bowden & Andy White, Private 
vs. Public Market Investors: Who’s Reaping the Gains from the Rise of 
Unicorns?, PRIV. MKT. PLAYBOOK, Q2 2018, at 4–7, 
https://files.pitchbook.com/website/files/pdf/2Q_2018_PitchBook_PlayBook
_Digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WF9-L2S5]; Corrie Driebusch, IPO Market 
Isn’t Quite Back as Many Startups Are Still Holding Out, WALL ST. J. (July 
5, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ipo-market-isnt-quite-back-as-many-
startups-are-still-holding-out-1499252401 (on file with the Columbia 
Business Law Review); Scott Kupor, Where Have All the IPOs Gone, 
ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ (June 19, 2017), https://a16z.com/2017/06/19/ipos/ 
[https://perma.cc/A6MV-Y329]; Keith Wright, Silicon Valley Tech Bubble Is 
Larger Than It Was in 2000, and the End Is Coming, CNBC (May 22, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/22/tech-bubble-is-larger-than-in-2000-and-
the-end-is-coming.html [https://perma.cc/V6D7-DA5W].  
4 See Sergey Chernenko, Josh Lerner & Yao Zeng, Mutual Funds as 
Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working 
Paper No. 18-037, 2017), https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20 
Files/18-037_02aee6d2-1209-449e-84df-c3730b4d7b4b.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RUR9-T2Y8]; Les Brorsen, Looking Behind the Declining 
Number of Public Companies, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. 
REG. (May 18, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/18/looking-
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number of privately held firms that are valued at $1 billion or 
more (so-called “unicorns”).5 Whereas, in the recent past, 
startups tended to go public or be sold approximately four 
years after founding, today the average time to IPO or sale is 
eleven years.6  
 
behind-the-declining-number-of-public-companies/ 
[https://perma.cc/N8KX-ZLY5]; Matt Levine, Opinion, Unicorns Take 
Different Paths to Being Public, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-03-27/unicorns-take-
different-paths-to-being-public [https://perma.cc/PJH3-NLGZ] (“[L]ate-
stage private investors now are doing the job that the post-IPO public 
investors used to do[.]”); MCKINSEY & CO., THE RISE AND RISE OF PRIVATE 





[https://perma.cc/YP2H-VUEB] (“Private asset managers raised a record 
sum of nearly $750 billion globally, extending a cycle that began eight years 
ago.”). 
5 A unicorn has the following features for the purposes of this Article: 
young but large, privately owned but “quasi-public,” invests in research and 
development (R&D) with intangible assets, venture capital-backed with 
concentrated ownership and controlling shareholders, and valued at over $1 
billion. The term “unicorn” was coined in 2013 by Aileen Lee. See Aileen 
Lee, Welcome to the Unicorn Club: Learning from Billion-Dollar Startups, 
TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 2, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/11/02/welcome-to-
the-unicorn-club/ [https://perma.cc/7WQP-NG6S]; see also Abraham J.B. 
Cable, Fool’s Gold? Equity Compensation & the Mature Startup, 11 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 613, 615 (2017); Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure 
and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 586 (2016).  
6 See Jamie Hutchinson, Why Are More Companies Staying Private?, 
GOODWIN (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/hutch 
inson-goodwin-presentation-acsec-021517.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MP9-
8FTM]; see also Begum Erdogan, Rishi Kant, Allen Miller & Kara Sprague, 
Grow Fast or Die Slow: Why Unicorns Are Staying Private, MCKINSEY & CO. 
(May 2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/high-tech/our-
insights/grow-fast-or-die-slow-why-unicorns-are-staying-private 
[https://perma.cc/RD4K-MDUD]; Matt Levine, Unicorn Buybacks and 
Securities Law, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 16, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-02-16/unicorn-buybacks-
and-securities-law (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). For 
more information on the decline in the U.S. IPO market, see generally Craig 
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Eight years ago, it was inconceivable that a venture capital 
(“VC”)-backed startup could reach an aggressive valuation of 
over $1 billion without going public.7 But today CB Insights, 
CNNMoney, Fortune, and The Wall Street Journal each keep 
a list of such companies and their valuations, and the lists 
keep growing.8 The United States has the largest 
concentration of unicorns in the world, and an estimated $700 
 
Doidge, Kathleen M. Kahle, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, Eclipse of 
the Public Corporation or Eclipse of the Public Markets?, J. APPLIED CORP. 
FIN., Winter 2018, at 8 [hereinafter Doidge et al., Eclipse of the Public 
Corporation]; Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, The U.S. 
Left Behind? Financial Globalization and the Rise of IPOs Outside the U.S., 
110 J. FIN. ECON. 546 (2013) [hereinafter Doidge et al., The U.S. Left 
Behind]; Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, The U.S. 
Listing Gap, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 464 (2017) [hereinafter Doidge et al., The 
U.S. Listing Gap]; Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter & Zhongyan Zhu, Where Have 
All the IPOs Gone?, 48 J. FIN. &. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1663 (2013).  
7 See David Cogman & Alan Lau, The ‘Tech Bubble’ Puzzle, MCKINSEY 
Q., no. 3, at 103, 104 (2016). 
8 See Scott Austin, Chris Canipe & Sarah Slobin, The Billion Dollar 
Startup Club, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/graphics/billion-dollar-club/ 
(on file with the Columbia Business Law Review) (last updated Dec. 2018) 
(showing list and valuation of firms as of Dec. 2018); Billion Dollar Startups, 
CNN TECH, https://money.cnn.com/interactive/technology/ 
billion-dollar-startups/ [https://perma.cc/MR2M-7598] (last updated June 
29, 2018); The Global Unicorn Club, CB INSIGHTS, 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies 
[https://perma.cc/4S6H-TZKB]; The Unicorn List, FORTUNE, 
http://fortune.com/unicorns/ [https://perma.cc/F7HC-MX64] (last updated 
Jan. 19, 2016); see also Ben Zimmer, How ‘Unicorns’ Became Silicon Valley 
Companies, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2015) http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-
unicorns-became-silicon-valley-companies-1426861606 (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). Companies that are valued at over $10 
billion are called “decacorns”. See Sarah Frier & Eric Newcomer, The Fuzzy, 
Insane Math That’s Creating So Many Billion-Dollar Tech Companies, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 2015), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-17/the-fuzzy-insane-
math-that-s-creating-so-many-billion-dollar-tech-companies (on file with 
the Columbia Business Law Review) (coining the term decacorns); see also 
Jillian D’Onfro, There Are So Many $10 Billion Startups That There’s a New 
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billion in unrealized value “is currently locked up in” these 
firms.9 By staying private and not pursuing an IPO or sale, 
unicorns are delaying liquidity events for their shareholders, 
including their employees.10  
High employee turnover hurts a firm’s bottom line. 
Unicorn firms are dealing with the highest turnover rates of 
knowledgeable employees among tech disruptors.11 despite 
the fact that they generally offer their employees a 
competitive salary and the highest annual equity awards.12 
This raises the question—even though unicorns do not need 
public markets to raise money, do they need them to attract, 
engage, and retain their talent? 
This Article builds on the work of Rock and Wachter13 and 
postulates that capital lock-in is important for startup 
 
9 In 2017 alone, “22% of the capital invested in the US was part of a 
deal valuing a company at $1 billion or more.” See PITCHBOOK, UNICORN 
REPORT 2017 ANNUAL 3 (2017) https://pitchbook.com/news/reports/2017-
annual-unicorn-report (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
10 See Erdogan et al., supra note 6 (“[P]rivate-market activity has 
ticked up significantly as employees and investors alike seek liquidity.”); see 
also Andy Kessler, Opinion, Unicorns Need IPOs, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/unicorns-need-ipos-1515361043 (on file with 
the Columbia Business Law Review) (“The economy needs this. The more 
companies are publicly traded, the more information quickly gets into the 
market. This is especially important in innovative industries. And for 
several years now, venture capitalists have been putting more into startups 
than they have been taking out in exits. That can’t last forever. Capitalism 
can’t perform at its highest potential with large opaque companies.”). 
11 See Amir Efrati & Peter Schultz, How Tech Firms Stack on Pay, 
INFORMATION (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/ 
how-tech-firms-stack-up-on-pay [https://perma.cc/GA3C-RGDY]; see also 
Tim Johnson, The Real Problem with Tech Professionals: High Turnover, 
FORBES (June 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesbusiness 
developmentcouncil/2018/06/29/the-real-problem-with-tech-professionals-
high-turnover/#37ddb3164201 [https://perma.cc/GRE2-BGT4]. 
12 This Article uses the terms “equity awards” or “compensation” 
broadly to include promises of equity (whether stock options or restricted 
stock units).  
13 The private startup company legal form is set to “lock-in parties 
while developing vulnerable match-specific assets.” Edward B. Rock & 
Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets 
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companies, including large unicorns, because the cost of 
investing in innovation-driven products or services is very 
high and risky. In order to allow startup firms to continue to 
raise capital, investors cannot easily threaten to exit and to 
withdraw their investment from the firm. It is thus important 
to turn to the changes in the market, the rise in investors with 
aggressive redemption rights, and the ways this rise changes 
the traditional governance structure of VC-backed unicorn 
firms.  
But there has been relatively little discussion in the 
literature on how changes to U.S. capital markets and recent 
legislation affect the behavior of unicorns as a repeat player 
in competitive technology markets, where companies 
aggressively compete for talent—i.e., knowledgeable 
employees.14 This Article fills that gap. It explores how U.S. 
 
and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 919 
(1999). 
14 For insights on equity compensation, see generally MICHAEL B. 
DORFF, INDISPENSABLE AND OTHER MYTHS: WHY THE CEO PAY EXPERIMENT 
FAILED AND HOW TO FIX IT (2014) (questioning the theoretical foundation for 
incentive pay and advocating for salary-based executive pay); ALAN HYDE, 
WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-
VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003) (providing a comprehensive overview of the 
Silicon Valley labor market and compensation practices); Robert Anderson 
IV, Employee Incentives and the Federal Securities Laws, 57 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1195, 1217–52 (2003) (discussing the status of employee options as 
securities); Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee 
Stock Options and Rule 10b-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2003) (focusing on the 
availability of Rule 10b-5 actions); Thomas A. Smith, The Zynga Clawback: 
Shoring Up the Central Pillar of Innovation, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 
589–606 (2013) (focusing on the law and economics of equity compensation 
as private ordering); Yifat Aran, Note, Beyond Covenants Not to Compete: 
Equilibrium in High-Tech Startup Labor Markets, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1235, 
1235 (2018) (discussing California’s public policy against noncompete 
enforcement and the new employee stock options market and noting that 
“employees at less successful firms can move to competitors at little or no 
cost, but valuable employees of successful private firms are, practically, 
handcuffed just as if they were subject to a powerful noncompete.”); Michael 
C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, 
but How, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1990, at 138, 141 (advocating for 
equity compensation as a form of incentive-based executive pay). 
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technology companies engage in a “war for talent,”15 a 
phenomenon that will continue to define the industry’s 
competitive landscape for years to come.16  
This Article examines this Silicon Valley puzzle—is there 
a shift in unicorn employee expectations that results in labor 
contract renegotiations? The answer is yes: The challenges 
that unicorn firms face as repeat players in competitive 
technology markets and the consequences of failing to meet 
their employees’ expectations have resulted in labor contract 
renegotiations. However, current securities and tax laws 
create legal barriers to private ordering, which prevent the 
parties from solving these issues on their own. 
The Article offers the following possible solutions. First, it 
proposes new equity-based compensation contracts for 
different types of employees (rank-and-file, managers, and 
founders) than those typically entered into today. Second, it 
explores alternatives to the traditional liquidity mechanism 
and offers the shortcomings of these possible alternatives. 
Third, it suggests new mandatory disclosure requirements, 
proposals to removing the legal barriers to private ordering, 
and the solutions provided, and complications created by, 
these suggested regulatory changes. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is also 
concerned with these challenges. In fact, the agency is 
exploring new rules that would make it easier for unicorns 
 
15 “The term ‘war on talent’ was coined by McKinsey’s Steven Hankin 
in 1997 and popularized by the book of that name in 2001.” Scott Keller & 
Mary Meaney, Attracting and Retaining the Right Talent, MCKINSEY & CO. 
(Nov. 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/ 
our-insights/attracting-and-retaining-the-right-talent [https://perma.cc/ 
G4C5-293G]; see also Shira Ovide, Opinion, Honey, I Shrunk Apple’s Profit 
Margins, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
view/articles/2018-08-02/apple-aapl-at-1-trillion-honey-i-shrunk-the-profit-
margins (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review) (“U.S. technology 
titans are in an arms race[.]“).  
16 See Elizabeth G. Chambers, Mark Foulon, Helen Handfield-Jones, 
Steven M. Hankin & Edward G. Michaels III, The War for Talent, MCKINSEY 
Q., 1998 Number 3, at 44, 46; see also Ovide, supra note 15.  
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“to compensate their workers by giving them stock in the 
company.”17 
Traditional employee equity contracts were not designed to 
prevent the heretofore unforeseen contingency of startups 
remaining private for significantly longer. This delayed 
timeline pre-IPO affects employee equity contracts and can 
trigger conflicts between employees and employers. 
Specifically, the major unicorn common shareholders 
(typically the founders)18 have greater power vis-à-vis 
preferred shareholders and minority common shareholders to 
prevent a sale and keep the company private longer.19 
According to incomplete contracting theory,20 this conflict, 
which results from new market dynamics and changes to 
unicorn startup governance arrangements, leads to 
renegotiation of employee equity compensation agreements.  
Equity compensation arrangements are customary in 
California, because they can incentivize retention and 
California labor law does not enforce non-compete clauses in 
 
17 See Dave Michaels, SEC Chairman Wants to Let More Main Street 
Investors in on Private Deals, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-chairman-wants-to-let-more-main-street-
investors-in-on-private-deals-1535648208 (on file with the Columbia 
Business Law Review). 
18 See Michael Ewens & Joan Farre-Mensa, The Deregulation of the 
Private Equity Markets and the Decline in IPOs 1 (Dec. 26, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3017610 
[https://perma.cc/S859-WT5F] (“The IPO decline is . . . . the result of 
founders taking advantage of their increased bargaining power and lower 
cost of being private to realize their preference for control by choosing to 
remain private.”). 
19 See infra Part III.  
20 See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts 
Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 473, 474 (1992) 
(explaining that sale of the firm can eliminate managers’ positions and their 
private benefits); Brian Broughman & Jesse Fried, Renegotiation of Cash 
Flow Rights in the Sale of VC-Backed Firms, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 384, 387 (2009) 
(“[C]ommon shareholders thus might prefer keeping the firm independent 
in the hope that it is later sold for a higher price or undergoes an IPO in 
which the VCs are forced to convert to common[.]”).  
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employment agreements.21 Most unicorns are located in 
Silicon Valley,22 and deal with employment contract 
renegotiations because of the common use of incentive equity 
compensation, such as stock options.23  
In the past, many talented individuals chose to work for a 
startup company for a below-market cash salary with a 
substantial stock option grant, dreaming of cashing out for a 
large sum of money after the startup’s IPO.24 Yet, today, due 
to “lock-in” and illiquidity of unicorn shares, employees are 
faced with a dilemma—if their stock options are expiring, they 
must choose between forfeiting them (and consequently 
forfeiting their chances of getting rich) or exercising them and 
paying cash for shares that may turn out to be worth far less 
than the exercise price.25 Because pre-IPO unicorn valuations 
are very high, many employees find that their options are 
prohibitively expensive due to liquidity constraints and tax 
concerns. There is a heated debate in Silicon Valley about 
whether the use of so-called “golden handcuffs,” the ninety-
day stock option exercise period applicable to departing 
employees, is fair or efficient due to these new market 
conditions.26 At a minimum, golden handcuffs “lock in” 
employees who may prefer to work for a younger startup with 
 
21 See generally Richard A. Booth, Give Me Equity or Give Me Death – 
The Role of Competition and Compensation in Silicon Valley, 1 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 265, 269 (2006); see also Aran, supra note 14, 
at 1238.  
22 For a list of states that have unicorn firms, see The United States of 
Unicorns: Every US Company Worth $1B+ in One Map, CBINSIGHTS (July 
25, 2017), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/startup-unicorns-us-map/ 
[https://perma.cc/3G5T-3D29].  
23 In the past, renegotiations of labor contracts were driven mainly by 
debt overhang, a debt burden so large that an entity cannot take on 
additional debt to finance future projects, and incentivizing employees with 
underwater options. See Broughman & Fried, supra note 20, at 385. Today, 
as will be discussed infra, renegotiations are driven by the firm’s decision to 
remain private longer and the illiquidity of its shares.  
24 See infra Part II.  
25 See infra Part II.  
26 See infra Part II.  
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more cutting-edge technology, and can thereby stifle 
innovation necessary for a growing economy27 
The shift in employee expectations is evident from public 
employee complaints about their unicorn employers,28 which 
not only causes reputational damage to employers29 but also 
raises the cost of employee monitoring due to the increased 
reputational risk. These complaints are available in public 
reports from online data sites such as Glassdoor, showing 
dissatisfaction among unicorn employees, especially about 
extreme capital lock-in and stock illiquidity.30  
In an effort to deal with these problems, various interest 
groups, including the National Venture Capital Association, 
have been successfully lobbying Congress for changes to tax 
and securities laws.31 This Article will introduce the new 
substantive legislative changes, including the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017, which provides an extended deferral period 
to certain employees.32 These changes are meant to deal with 
 
27 See, e.g., Aran, supra note 14, at 1239–40 (“[T]he lock-in effect of 
stock options might significantly impede the departure of much-needed 
entrepreneurial talent from the most successful private firms.”).  
28 Judith Samuelson, Why Do We Still Call It Capitalism?, QUARTZ 
(Apr. 9, 2018), https://work.qz.com/1247835/spotifys-ipo-should-make-us-
consider-why-we-still-use-the-term-capitalism/ [https://perma.cc/H5GK-
4H4D]. Unicorn employee complaints are not private anymore, as the 
“conversation has moved to employee hangouts, both virtual and real, to 
interview rooms on college campuses, and to public conversations about 
Board diversity, the glass ceiling, and in the talent pool.” Id. 
29 For more on agency costs and reputation, see Eugene F. Fama, 
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 291–92 
(1980).  
30 These sites rank the “Best Companies to Work For,” and employees 
pay “careful attention . . . to Employee Engagement Scores that link 
corporate reputation, employee motivation, and productivity.” Samuelson, 
supra note 28.  
31 See infra notes 180–83 and accompanying text.  
32 See Richard Lieberman, 2017 Tax Act Impact on Employee Benefits 
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the problem of inefficient retention function of unicorn stock 
option plans. 
Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”)33, the largest unicorn firm 
in the United States by equity valuation, helps illustrate the 
shift in employee expectations that has spurred 
renegotiations and high employee turnover at unicorns. Uber 
is currently dealing with high turnover rates of 
knowledgeable employees,34 despite generally offering a 
competitive salary and the second-highest annual equity 
award in the industry.35 Software engineers at Uber are 
better compensated than those working for Google,36 
Microsoft,37 Amazon,38 and Apple.39 Uber continues to change 
its equity compensation contracts, however, because of the 
lock-in problem and illiquidity of its shares, and leads “the 
 
benefits-and-executivecompensation.aspx [https://perma.cc/K6JP-FET7]; 
see also infra Section IV.A.2. 
33 Uber is a privately held firm that was founded in 2009. See Alison 
Griswold, Former Uber Employees Have Gone into Debt to Hang onto Shares 
They Still Can’t Sell, QUARTZ (Dec. 10, 2017), https://qz.com/1149381/uber-
softbank-shares-debt/ [https://perma.cc/KP8W-LUJP]. From 2013 to 2016, 
Uber’s valuation increased from $3.5 billion to approximately $70 billion. 
Id. 
34 This paper uses the term “employee” very broadly to include any 
person who receives equity compensation, including rank and file staff and 
senior management. 
35 Uber pays a software engineer, on average, an annual equity 
compensation of $157,000. See Efrati & Schultz, supra note 11. In 
comparison, on average, Google pays $59,000, Microsoft pays $40,000, Apple 
pays $39,000, and Amazon pays $33,000. See id.  
36 Google pays a software engineer an average base salary of $132,000, 
an average annual equity of $59,000, an average annual bonus of $22,000, 
and an average signing bonus of $20,000 (total: $233,000). Id.  
37 Microsoft pays an average base salary of $135,000, an average 
annual equity of $40,000, an average annual bonus of $30,000, and an 
average signing bonus of $17,000 (total: $222,000). Id.  
38 Amazon pays an average base salary of $121,000, an average annual 
equity of $33,000, an average annual bonus of $19,000, and an average 
signing bonus of $30,000 (total: $203,000). Id. 
39 Apple pays an average base salary of $127,000, an average annual 
equity of $39,000, an average annual bonus of $20,000, and an average 
signing bonus of $22,000 (total: $208,000). Id. 
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race to the bottom, with 1.2 years [as] the average employee 
tenure.”40  
This Article explores the consequences of failing to meet 
employee expectations and offers possible solutions. Part II 
introduces the historical, economic, and legal evolution of 
employee stock option plans, starting with the standard stock 
option plan in Section II.A and the traditional governance 
structures of VC-backed startups in Section II.B. Section II.C 
describes the shift in employee expectations, which causes 
labor contract renegotiations aimed at addressing the 
problems of capital lock-in and illiquidity of unicorn stock.  
Part III describes recent changes to U.S. capital markets, 
including regulatory changes, such as the Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act of 2012, which affect unicorn 
firms’ ability to stay private for longer periods of time. Section 
III.A provides an overview of the decline in IPOs. Section III.B 
presents the new private market participants, mutual funds 
and sovereign wealth funds, which invest large amounts of 
capital in unicorn firms. Section III.C argues that changes to 
the traditional startup financing model and to governance 
structures of VC-backed firms has increased the founders’ 
ability to maintain control over the firm by preventing a sale, 
especially when VC-investment rounds are structured as 
“friendly” financing rounds.  
Part IV discusses suggestions for dealing with the 
challenges faced by unicorns, their investors, and their 
employees and proposes possible solutions. Section IV.A 
 
40 Uber is also dealing with organizational and corporate culture 
problems, including leadership turnover and lawsuits over sexual 
misconduct. See Biz Carson, Inside Uber’s Effort to Fix Its Culture Through 
a Harvard-Inspired ‘University’, FORBES (Feb. 3, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bizcarson/2018/02/03/inside-ubers-effort-to-
fix-its-culture-through-a-harvard-inspired-university/#7fcfbc5c1695 
[https://perma.cc/M8G4-MQM5]. Airbnb, like Uber, is a unicorn with high 
employee turnover and a short employee tenure of 1.64 years, but has not 
dealt with these other problems. See Paysa Team, The Top Talent of Tech 
Disruptors and Titans, PAYSA (July 10, 2017), 
https://www.paysa.com/blog/the-top-talent-of-tech-disruptors-and-titans/ 
[https://perma.cc/AJC9-DZ5C]. There is also data on growth and number of 
employees of unicorns. Id.  
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presents contractual alternatives to the traditional stock 
option plan (and employee contract) and addresses potential 
pitfalls. Section IV.B describes alternatives to the traditional 
liquidity mechanisms and their possible issues.  
Part V proposes new recommendations that could operate 
alongside these suggestions. Section V.A calls for protection of 
unicorn employees. Section V.B presents recent regulatory 
and legislative developments, including the Economic 
Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act and 
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, and provides constructive criticism 
of these developments. Urgent amendments and 
comprehensive reform to the current regulatory and 
legislative models are needed to remove legal barriers to 
private ordering. This Part then proposes new disclosure 
requirements to improve efficiency and reduce information 
asymmetries.  
Finally, Part VI concludes with a call for reform to the 
current regulatory and legislative models, and recommends 
providing unicorn employees with liquidity opportunities and 
adequate disclosures that can improve efficiency and reduce 
information asymmetries. By increasing equitable and more 
sustainable employee participation in the operation of the 
unicorn firm, these changes can improve the prospects for 
unicorn companies.  
II. EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTION PLANS 
In the formation stages of a startup, founders “split the pie” 
with employees and investors. As noted above, individuals 
historically chose to work at high-risk startups for a modest 
cash salary with significant stock option grants, in the hopes 
that they could cash out for a large sum of money41 after an 
 
41 See Ryan Decker, John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin & Javier Miranda, 
The Role of Entrepreneurship in US Job Creation and Economic Dynamism, 
28 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (2014) (“[A] small fraction of young firms exhibit very 
high growth and contribute substantially to job creation.”). 
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IPO of the startup’s stock.42 Employee option grants made it 
possible for employees to participate in the growth of the 
business without having to put significant amounts of capital 
at risk43 or to pay income tax that would ordinarily be due on 
additional cash compensation.44 This mechanism became 
popular due to the recognition that employee equity-sharing 
improves overall firm productivity, shareholder returns, and 
profit levels.45  
From the employer’s perspective, equity compensation 
preserves cash, which is a precious commodity for most early 
startup firms.46 Because a startup firm’s internal cash flow is 
typically insufficient to support47 the firm’s expanding 
 
42 See Joseph Blasi, Douglas Kruse & Richard Freeman, Having a 
Stake: Evidence and Implications for Broad-Based Employee Stock 
Ownership and Profit Sharing, THIRD WAY (Feb. 1, 2017), 
https://www.thirdway.org/report/having-a-stake-evidence-and-
implications-for-broad-based-employee-stock-ownership-and-profit-sharing 
[perma.cc/B9T7-2V8K]; see also DOUGLAS L. KRUSE, RICHARD B. FREEMAN & 
JOSEPH R. BLASI, SHARED CAPITALISM AT WORK: EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, 
PROFIT AND GAIN SHARING, AND BROAD-BASED STOCK OPTIONS 257–89 (2010). 
43 In order to attract labor to Silicon Valley, startups used stock option 
plans. See William Lazonick, The Financialization of the U.S. Corporation: 
What Has Been Lost, and How It Can Be Regained, 36 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 
857, 865 (2013); see also WILLIAM LAZONICK, SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY IN THE 
NEW ECONOMY? BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND HIGH-TECH EMPLOYMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES 51–56 (2009) (discussing Cisco as an example of a 
company that attracted employees with stock options). 
44 See Lazonick, supra note 43, at 874–75. 
45 See Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation 
Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1901 (2001) (“These options could take 
many forms, but there is remarkable conformity in the practice of giving a 
class of employees a large percentage of compensation (in expected value 
terms) in the form of options[.]”); see also Smith, supra note 14 (discussing 
at-will contracts and equity compensation). 
46 See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & DIANE W. SAVAGE, MANAGERS AND THE 
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 519 (2010).  
47 See LARS OLA BENGTSSON, REPEATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
VENTURE CAPITALISTS AND ENTREPRENEURS 3 (2006) (examining data on 
1500 serial entrepreneurs and finding that a failed entrepreneur is twice as 
likely to repeat VC relationships). Various studies show that approximately 
eighty to ninety percent of entrepreneurial firms that are unable to get 
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technology, research, and development needs, such firms 
commonly raise capital to fund the acquisition and 
development of essential intangible assets.48  
The financing of young startup firms presents challenges 
to prospective investors and innovators. These challenges 
result from information barriers that are associated with 
investing in such firms. They result from uncertainty,49 
 
venture capital backing fail within five to seven years of formation. See U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-00-190, SMALL BUSINESS: EFFORTS TO 
FACILITATE EQUITY CAPITAL FORMATION 19 (2000) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] 
(approximately eighty percent of new businesses fail or no longer exist 
within five to seven years of formation). 
48 If a startup cannot raise capital to support its growth, it will probably 
have to go through a bankruptcy process. Bankruptcy is often the result of 
a financing and information gap, which is termed in Silicon Valley the 
“Valley of Death.” See Josh Lerner & Paul A. Gompers, The Money of 
Invention: How Venture Capital Creates New Wealth, UBIQUITY (Jan. 2002), 
http://ubiquity.acm.org/article.cfm?id=763904 [perma.cc/CX5Z-4A4V]; see 
also PHILLIP E. AUERSWALD, LEWIS M. BRANSCOMB, NICHOLAS DEMOS & 
BRIAN K. MIN, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NIST GCR 02-841A, 
UNDERSTANDING PRIVATE-SECTOR DECISION MAKING FOR EARLY-STAGE 
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 35–38 (2005), https://www.nist.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/2017/05/09/gcr02-841a.pdf [perma.cc/6LBZ-4UFX]; 
LEWIS M. BRANSCOMB & PHILLIP E. AUERSWALD, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & 
TECH., NIST GCR 02-841, BETWEEN INVENTION AND INNOVATION: AN 
ANALYSIS OF FUNDING FOR EARLY-STAGE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 35–38 
(2002), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/05/09/ 
gcr02-841.pdf [perma.cc/NW5F-RRWJ]; George S. Ford, Thomas M. 
Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, An Economic Investigation of the Valley of 
Death in the Innovation Sequence 3–6 (Phoenix Ctr. for Advanced Legal & 
Econ. Pub. Policy Studies, Discussion Paper, 2007), http://www.osec.doc. 
gov/ReportValley%20of%20Death%20Funding%20Gap.pdf [perma.cc/ 
K4BB-4LFU];. Additionally, the more outside capital needed, the greater 
the dilution of the founders’ interests. See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. 
DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO LAW AND STRATEGY (5th ed. 2018).  
49 See PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 157 
(2d ed. 2004) (discussing how entrepreneurs and budding companies, by 
their very nature, are associated with considerable levels of uncertainty). 
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information asymmetry,50 and agency problems,51 all of which 
contribute to “adverse selection,” where investors have 
difficulty screening and selecting entrepreneurs.52 Moreover, 
the markets for allocating risk capital to startups are 
inefficient,53 and until recently precluded non-VC investors 
from backing such firms.54  
This Article focuses on VC-backed startups in the United 
States. Traditional VC investors, who invest in the first 
significant round of financing, typically acquire up to forty to 
sixty percent of a given startup, in the form of preferred stock 
with specified rights and preferences.55 VCs also generally 
require that startups reserve about ten to twenty percent of 
equity for key hires and rank-and-file employees.56  
VCs are sophisticated equity capital investors57 (so-called 
“smart money”), and they almost always require tech company 
 
50 See id. at 158; Laura Lindsey, Blurring Firm Boundaries: The Role 
of Venture Capital in Strategic Alliances, 63 J. FIN. 1137, 1154 (2008). 
51 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305, 309 (1976) (“The problem of inducing an ‘agent’ to behave as if 
he were maximizing the ‘principal’s’ welfare is quite general.”). 
52 See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) 
(discussing the “adverse selection” problem and focusing on the lemons 
problem); see also Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior 
& Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. 
L. REV. 45, 56 (2002).  
53 See Utset, supra note 52, at 54–56. 
54 See BRANSCOMB & AUERSWALD, supra note 48, at 35–38.  
55 See BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 519; see also BAGLEY & 
DAUCHY, supra note 48, at 79. 
56 See BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 519; see also BAGLEY & 
DAUCHY, supra note 48, at 79.  
57 VCs are “highly specialized financial intermediaries.” YINGLAN TAN, 
THE WAY OF THE VC: HAVING TOP VENTURE CAPITALISTS ON YOUR BOARD 244 
(2010). They offer “optimal services” to an entrepreneurial firm that is 
positioned within the fund’s concentrated industry, which is usually very 
narrowly defined. See Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge 
Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards A Knowledge-Based 
Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123 (2007); see also Bengtsson, 
supra note 47. Professional VC funds also face information asymmetry 
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management to issue options to employees, both because they 
incentivize the labor force to maximize their efforts and 
because they mitigate the problems of asymmetric 
information.58 
Options help screen prospective employees to find those 
who are committed and willing to tie their fate with that of 
the company.59 The presumption is that the employees are 
only willing to take that risk if they believe in the future 
success of the business, which can contribute to the firm’s 
growth.60 
This Article next briefly describes the process of issuing 
equity compensation to employees. It then discusses the 
corporate governance structure of VC-backed startups, 
explaining the pattern and purpose behind the widespread 
use of preferred stock by VCs.  
A. Standard Stock Option Plans 
Employee stock options are very popular among growth 
companies in the United States—so much so that most high-
tech startups, including Google, Intel, and Microsoft, use 
 
issues. Accordingly, only ten percent of venture capitalists make their 
expected rate of return. GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 19; see also Amy E. 
Knaup, Survival and Longevity in the Business Employment Dynamics 
Data, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 2005, 50, 51 (stating that thirty-four percent 
of new businesses fail within their first two years and fifty-six percent fail 
within four years). 
58 See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 57; see also JAMES V. DELONG, 
COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., THE STOCK OPTIONS CONTROVERSY AND THE NEW 
ECONOMY 8 (2002), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/James%20DeLong%20-
%20The%20Stock%20Options%20Controversy%20And%20The%20New%2
0Economy.pdf [perma.cc/GY9Q-XJFT].  
59 See DELONG, supra note 58, at 7–8. 
60 See id. at 8 n.15 (“This point is different from the argument that stock 
options keep individual incentives aligned with the corporate good. The 
point here is that in the context of technical products and uncertainty, a 
process that pre-selects employees for belief is a good thing for the 
financiers.”); Edward P. Lazear, Output-Based Pay: Incentives or Sorting? 4 
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equity compensation to build their companies.61 Stock option 
plans are contracts between the company and its employees. 
These contracts are designed to attract, engage, and retain 
employees,62 by encouraging them to share in the ownership 
of their firm (while the company preserves its cash).63  
The idea that employees should share in the ownership of 
their firm is not a new one, and indeed has a strong history in 
American entrepreneurship.64 Tying a worker’s pay to 
company performance can make the worker better off or worse 
off, depending on the balance between risk and reward, 
contractual design, and market conditions. During the 1990s, 
the media publicized the success stories of Silicon Valley high 
tech employees who were fortunate enough to become 
millionaires overnight following a successful IPO.65 By 
contrast, during the early 2000s the media covered horror 
stories about large public companies, such as Enron, that 
engaged in rampant fraud and caused their employees to lose 
most of their retirement savings, which was invested in 
company stock or tied to company performance.66  
Today, the media covers stories on employees who work for 
unicorn firms and end up in debt when they take on loans to 
exercise their stock options and pay any related taxes.67 
Moreover, as noted above, unicorn firms and VCs in Silicon 
Valley are publicly debating whether the use of “golden 
 
61 Blasi et al., supra note 42. 
62 See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 57, at 1185 (“Stock options are 
a crucial tool for startups in the high-tech industry to retain knowledgeable 
employees.”). 
63 However, there is no consensus as to which of the designs achieves 
these results. See BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 519.  
64 The United States has a long history of promoting broad-based 
private property ownership. See Blasi et al., supra note 42. 
65 High tech employees usually get stock options. See Blasi et al., supra 
note 42; see also KRUSE ET AL., supra note 42, at 257–89.  
66 Enron’s employee 401(k) plan was heavily invested in its stock. See 
Blasi et al., supra note 42.  
67 See, e.g., Matt Levine, Opinion, Work for Uber, Wind Up in Debt, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-
12-13/work-for-uber-wind-up-in-debt [perma.cc/5LQY-AKXP].  
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handcuffs” is fair due to “lock-in” and illiquidity of unicorn 
shares.68 The problem with using stock option contracts to 
attract, engage and retain unicorn employees is that it is 
difficult to create a liquid market for unicorn shares. Unicorns 
are large privately held firms whose founders often do not 
want to go public or be sold. As a result, traditional stock 
option contracts may be ill-suited for employees at these 
companies. 
1. Standard Stock Option Process and Contract 
Stock option plans are contracts between a company and 
its employees (or its directors and advisors).69 The stock 
option contract gives the optionee (the holder who is granted 
the option), the right to buy a certain number of shares at a 
strike price (or exercise price), which is typically fixed at fair 
market value of the options at the time of grant.70 The option 
may be exercised for the exercise period, which is a fixed 
number of years, typically ten.71  
The stock option contract is designed as a long-term 
contract with a perpetual pipeline of unvested options to 
prevent employees from leaving the company.72 The company 
imposes vesting restrictions,73 which limit the employees’ 
ability to exercise the options for a stated period of time, 
usually four years.74 The employees must be employed by the 
company during this period. A common vesting schedule is 
 
68 See infra Section III.C. 
69 See Levmore, supra note 45, at 1901; see also Smith, supra note 14, 
at 580. 
70 See BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 519. 
71 See id. 
72 See Lazonick, supra note 43, at 865 (“So that stock options would 
perform a retention function as well as an attraction function, the practice 
evolved in New Economy firms of making option grants annually, with the 
vesting period for any annual block of option grants being 25% of the grants 
at the end of each of the first four years after the grant date.”).  
73 Id. 
74 See BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 519; see also Smith, supra 
note 14, at 586. 
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called “cliff vesting,” whereby one-fourth of the options vest at 
the end of the first year, with the balance becoming 
exercisable on a monthly basis, over the next three years.75  
The option is valuable if the contract is designed for a long 
period until expiration.76 As long as the employee continued 
to work for the company, she would typically have up to ten 
years to exercise the options from the grant date.77 If, 
however, the employee left the firm, the option agreement 
would typically give the employee only ninety days to exercise 
any vested options, a practice called “golden handcuffs.”78  
Employees benefit from vested options if their company 
goes public, as they are able to sell the stock and realize the 
upside value that they helped create.79 But today many 
unicorn companies remain private, while their employees 
must pay large sums of money out-of-pocket for the exercise 
 
75 See infra Part III; see also Lazonick, supra note 43, at 865. 
76 According to the Black-Scholes option pricing model, an option is 
more valuable the longer the period until expiration. See Fischer Black & 
Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. 
ECON. 637, 638 (1973).  
77 See Lazonick, supra note 43, at 865. This practice derives from 
Section 422(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides that an 
“incentive stock option” must not be “exercisable after the expiration of 10 
years” from the grant date. I.R.C. § 422 (West 2017). 
78 See, e.g., Connie Loizos, Handcuffed to Uber, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 29, 
2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/29/handcuffed-to-uber/ [perma.cc/ 
WRW7-X48L]. 
79 See BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 347.  
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price and taxes80 on profit that may never materialize.81 As a 
result, the value of equity options to employees is 
diminished—helping to explain why unicorn firms are 
experiencing difficulties with attracting, engaging and 
retaining talent.82  
In general, unicorn employees hope that the company will 
go public and that the shares will be traded at a price higher 
than the exercise price. In the event of a sale of the company, 
employees can exercise the vested options prior to the sale. 
After doing so, they will either be able to sell their shares or 
their options will be canceled in exchange for a payment equal 
to the spread between the exercise price and the sale price.83  
 
80 Federal and state taxes are imposed on exercise of equity options, 
even when there is no active market to sell them and such a market might 
never materialize. See Lieberman, supra note 32; see also New Tax Act 
Provides Tax Deferral Opportunity for Private Company Equity 
Compensation Awards, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP (Jan. 8, 2018) 
[hereinafter New Tax Act], https://www.davispolk.com/files/2018-01-
08_tax_act_provides_deferral_opportunity_private_company_equity_comp
ensation_awards.pdf [perma.cc/378N-FK2V] (“This potential disconnect has 
grown more prevalent in recent years as many tech companies have 
deferred their initial public offerings, frustrating the ability of employees to 
receive the benefit of equity awards without paying taxes out of pocket.”); 
Kathleen Pender, Bills Would Ease Tax Burden of Private-Company Stock 
Options, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.sfchronicle. 
com/business/networth/article/Bills-would-ease-tax-burden-of-private-
company-9157182.php [perma.cc/7GDT-JMTY]; Tax “Reform” and Its 
Impact On Stock Compensation, MYSTOCKOPTIONS.COMBLOG (Dec. 20, 
2017), http://mystockoptions.typepad.com/blog/2017/12/tax-reform-and-its-
impact-on-stock-compensation.html [perma.cc/2RSG-FFZ4]. 
81  This can also lead to a cash-flow issue for the unicorn firm. The firm 
is required to withhold and remit income and employment taxes at the time 
of the exercise (for NSOs) or vesting (for RSUs), but it is not transferring 
any cash to the grantee from which it can withhold those amounts. See Scott 
Belsky, Don’t Get Trampled: The Puzzle for “Unicorn” Employees, MEDIUM 
(Jan. 2, 2017), https://medium.com/positiveslope/dont-get-trampled-the-
puzzle-for-unicorn-employees-8f00f33c784f [perma.cc/76C3-E9CE] 
82 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, How Valuable Is a Unicorn? Maybe Not as 
Much as It Claims to Be, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2yvpuyk 
[perma.cc/4Y7C-3KAA]. 
83 See Ilona Babenko, Fangfang Du & Yuri Tserlukevich, Will I Get 
Paid? Employee Stock Options and Mergers and Acquisitions 1 (European 
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2. ISOs vs. NSOs 
There are two types of stock options, incentive stock 
options (“ISOs”)84 and nonstatutory stock options (NSOs),85 
which are treated differently for the purpose of federal income 
tax. ISOs are granted only to employees. Employees can only 
take advantage of the beneficial tax treatment afforded to 
ISOs when certain requirements are met. First, the option’s 
exercise price, or the price per share at which the option can 
be purchased, cannot be less than the fair market value on the 
date of the grant.86 Second, employees cannot transfer ISOs 
to others, except on death. Third, the company’s board of 
directors and shareholders must approve the written plan to 
grant ISOs. Fourth, as noted above, the employee must 
exercise the ISOs within the earlier of ten years from the 
grant date or ninety days of termination of employment.87 
Fifth, employees may not exercise more than a $100,000 value 
of ISOs in any one calendar year, as determined at the time of 
grant. Finally, there is a holding requirement: employees 
must hold the shares for at least two years after the grant date 
and one year after the exercise date.  
If all the conditions are met, then the employee will not 
have any tax consequences at the time of grant or when the 
options are exercised.88 After a disposition (such as a sale) of 
 
Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper No. 486/2016, 2017) (“In 79.9% of all 
completed M&A deals, some of the target’s outstanding employee stock 
options are terminated by the acquirer. . . . Further, employees are often 
forced to accept the intrinsic value of their vested in-the-money stock 
options in lieu of the Black-Scholes value[.]”) 
84 ISOs are mainly used by private companies. See BAGLEY & SAVAGE, 
supra note 46, at 521. 
85 Id. 
86 If the employee is a stockholder of ten percent or more in the 
company, then the exercise price must be equal to one hundred ten percent 
of the fair market value of the underlying security on the date of grant.  
87 If the employee is a stockholder of ten percent or more in the 
company, then it is five years from the date of grant. The ninety-day period 
can be extended if the termination is due to disability or death. 
88 NSOs do not have tax consequences at the time of grant (unless 
options are granted below fair market value). 
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the stock acquired upon exercise of the options, any gain or 
loss is treated as a long-term capital gain or loss. The 
employer has no withholding at exercise and no deduction.89 
If the holding requirements are not met, then the disposition 
is disqualified, and the ISOs are taxed as NSOs. Also, the 
alternative minimum tax may be tax payable upon the 
exercise of even ISOs.90 
NSOs have fewer restrictions and are not limited to 
employees.91 In practice, NSO plans are usually written with 
a requirement that the exercise price cannot be less than the 
fair market value on the date of the grant, because section 
409A of the Internal Revenue Code regulates nonqualified 
deferred compensation paid by a service recipient to a service 
provider by generally imposing a twenty percent 
excise tax when certain design or operational rules contained 
in the section are violated.92 The NSOs holder will be taxed at 
the time of exercise but not at the time of grant.93 The 
difference between the value of the underlying security at the 
time of exercise of the NSOs and the exercise price of the 
NSOs is taxed as ordinary income.94 If the holder of the NSOs 
is an employee, the taxable amount is subject to withholding 
and employment taxes.95 After a sale, there are different tax 
treatments of the gain or loss depending on the holding 
period.96 If the underlying securities are held for one year or 
less after exercise, then the income is taxed as a short-term 
 
89 With NSOs, there is a deduction on the spread (the excess of the fair 
market value of the stock at the date of exercise over the exercise period) at 
exercise. 
90 See BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 521. 
91 See I.R.C. § 409A (2012). 
92 Id. Noncompliance with section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code 
can result in adverse tax consequences to the holder of the NSOs (and the 
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capital gain or loss.97 If they are held for more than one year, 
then the tax treatment is for long-term capital gains.98  
As noted above, stock option plans were designed to retain 
talent and prevent “leakage from firm knowledge resources to 
other competitors.”99 According to Gorga and Halberstam, 
startup firms wanted to avoid the high costs associated with 
employee turnover and prevent the negative effect that high 
employee turnover has on company morale.100  
According to labor market analysis, when employees 
receive specialized training they become very valuable to the 
firm and turnover becomes very costly.101 Similarly 
qualified—but inexperienced—replacements require costly 
training to attain the proficiency of highly-trained employees. 
Therefore, these contracts were designed as long-term 
contracts to minimize departure.102 
B. Traditional Governance Structure of VC-Backed 
Startups 
While startups preferred equity payment plans for 
retention and cash-flow purposes, the favorable tax 
treatments for ISOs and NSOs made them appealing to 
employees as well. However, changes to the traditional 
governance structure of VC-backed firms caused a shift in 




99 Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 57, at 1125 (“[T]he adoption of stock 
option plans in high-tech firms controls knowledge hazards[.]”).  
100 Id. 
101 See generally Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Tailored 
Claims and Governance: The Fit Between Employees and Shareholders, in 
EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe 
eds., 1999); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious 
Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 1619 (2001).  
102 See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Michael L. Wachter & Jeffrey E. 
Harris, Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of 
Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. 250 (1975).  
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problem that will be discussed later.103 To understand these 
changes, though, it is important to first review the traditional 
governance structures of VC-backed startups.  
Entrepreneurial high-growth and high-technology firms 
(“startups”) are an important source of new experimentation 
and ideas, which would otherwise remain untapped in the 
economy.104 Young (both large and small) startups play an 
important role in creating jobs, generating technological 
innovation and stimulating the U.S. economy.105 However, 
many venture capital firms are concerned about the unicorn 
phenomenon and its adverse effect on the traditional startup 
funding model.106  
 
103 See infra Part III.C. 
104 For a detailed explanation on how ideas promote growth, see 
generally Charles I. Jones, Growth and Ideas, in 1B HANDBOOK OF 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 1063 (Philippe Aghion & Steven N. Durlauf eds., 2005). 
105 Empirical evidence tying startups to job creation began developing 
in the late 1970s and continued to grow through the 1980s. See, e.g., David 
L. Birch, Who Creates Jobs?, 65 PUB. INT. 3 (1981), 
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/public_interest/detail/who-creates-jobs 
[https://perma.cc/4SFS-H84X]; see also ZOLTAN J. ACS & DAVID B. 
AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND SMALL FIRMS (1990) (establishing the greater 
weight of small firms in contributing to the U.S. economy and in generating 
technological innovations relative to large firms); ROBERT JAY DILGER, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41523, SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION AND JOB 
CREATION (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41523.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V4A5-MZ68]; Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch, 
Innovation in Large and Small Firms: An Empirical Analysis, 78 AM. ECON. 
REV. 678 (1988). Entrepreneurship is considered to be an important 
mechanism for economic development through employment, innovation 
and welfare effects. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET 
INNOVATION MACHINE (2002); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1934); Acs & Audretsch, supra; Sander 
Wennekers & Roy Thurik, Linking Entrepreneurship and Economic 
Growth, 13 SMALL BUS. ECON. 27 (1999). 
106 See PITCHBOOK, supra note 9, at 3 (“Many venerable VCs view the 
unicorn phenomenon with scorn, operating under the assumption that 
billion-dollar valuations are a distraction—and potentially a detriment—to 
the traditional startup funding model.”).  
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1. Traditional Pattern of VC Preferred Stock 
The typical U.S. VC-backed start-up has two classes of 
stock: common and preferred, which can include multiple 
series. Startups usually issue preferred stock to VCs107 and do 
so after each new round of financing.108 In contrast, founders, 
employees, angels, and other early investors receive common 
stock.109 
Preferred stock grants its holders priority over common 
stock in the event of sale or liquidation and in the payment of 
dividends.110 If the firm is sold or dissolves, then the VCs will 
receive an amount equal to their liquidation preference before 
the common shareholders (the founders, employees, and angel 
investors) receive anything.111 This is one of the reasons for 
 
107 VCs traditionally invest in startups using convertible preferred 
stock. See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting 
Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital 
Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281 (2003); see also William A. Sahlman, 
The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. 
ECON. 473 (1990).  
108 See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist 
Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 981–82 (2006). 
109 See id. at 981.  
110 For more on the exit strategy of VCs, see D. Gordon Smith, The Exit 
Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 316 (2005) (“Before 
venture capitalists invest, they plan for exit.”). For helpful background on 
the distinction between cash-flow and control rights, see generally Zohar 
Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law 
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 784–85 (2017); see also William 
W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1815, 1875 (2013) (“Venture capitalists holding preferred sometimes 
take voting control and can dominate the boards of directors even when 
holding a minority of the votes.”); Fried & Ganor, supra note 108, at 981; 
Utset, supra note 52, at 61 (“Venture capitalists in most instances negotiate 
to get outright control of the board.”). 
111 Sometimes in a subsequent round of financing, liquidation 
preferences from early rounds are waived or reduced, “to eliminate debt 
overhang.” Broughman & Fried, supra note 20, at 391 n.6. Alternatively, a 
VC can be forced to convert to common and give up its preferences, if there 
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recent controversial lawsuits; common stock holders, such as 
mutual funds, sue for breach of fiduciary duty after they do 
not get anything from the sale of the company.112 
If the firm conducts an IPO113 (or is sold for a very high 
price), then the amount a VC could receive as a common 
stockholder may exceed its liquidation preference. In this 
case, a VC will convert its preferred stock to common at a pre-
defined ratio.114 As noted, most employees dream of an IPO, 
but the most common form of VC exit is a sale.115  
In order to gain from their investment and provide 
liquidity for the investors in their fund, VCs will look for a 
 
112 See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. S’holder. Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(involving claims against the board of a startup that was sold in a merger 
transaction). For an example of a subsequent court attempting to interpret 
Trados’s holding on the mechanics of fairness review, see In re Nine 
Systems Corp. S’holders. Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 3940-VCN, 2014 WL 
4383127 (Del. Ch. 2014); see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note 110; 
Abraham J.B. Cable, Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate Law, 66 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 51, 75–76 (2015); Adam M. Katz, Comment, Addressing the 
Harm to Common Stockholders in Trados and Nine Systems, 118 COLUM. L. 
REV. ONLINE 234 (2018). 
113 Many have written on VCs exit at IPO. See, e.g., Christopher B. 
Barry, Chris J. Muscarella, John W. Peavy III & Michael R. Vetsuypens, 
The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public Companies: Evidence 
from the Going-Public Process, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 447 (1990); Paul A. 
Gompers, Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 
133 (1996); Peggy M. Lee & Sunil Wahal, Grandstanding, Certification, and 
the Underpricing of Venture Capital Backed IPOs, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 375 
(2004); William L. Megginson & Kathleen A. Weiss, Venture Capitalist 
Certification in Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 879 (1991). 
114 See Broughman & Fried, supra note 20 (contributed to the literature 
on VC exit via private sale and found that renegotiation is more likely when 
governance arrangements, including the firm’s choice of corporate law, give 
common shareholders the power to impede the sale); Thomas Hellmann, 
IPOs, Acquisitions and the Use of Convertible Securities in Venture Capital, 
81 J. FIN. ECON. 649 (2006).  
115 See Broughman & Fried, supra note 20, at 385 (noting that the most 
common VC exit is private sale). Broughman and Fried suggest that, “when 
exiting through a sale, VCs generally have sufficient control to realize their 
full cash flow rights. However, VCs sometimes need to pay common 
shareholders to obtain their support for the proposed sale, and the 
likelihood of such renegotiation is higher when VCs have less control.” Id. 
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quick exit. VCs have a bias towards early liquidity events, 
even if “the expected value of remaining an independent 
private company is higher.”116  
The preferred stock is therefore used as a signaling tool to 
VCs that the entrepreneur believes in the worth of the 
startup.117 By demanding preferred stock, the VCs make sure 
that the entrepreneur will not profit from the startup until the 
proceeds from an IPO or sale are greater than the VC’s 
liquidation preference.118  
Therefore, the typical start-up lifecycle pattern proceeds as 
follows. The founders, backed by early equity capital 
providers, hire employees (the factors of production)119 and 
offer them equity incentives. Employees who are willing to 
take a risk with the start-up accept a lower salary and a 
substantial stock option grant (or other equity incentive 
plan).120 Finally, VC investors will look for an exit 
opportunity. As noted, there are three exit possibilities.  
First, the board of directors (usually controlled by the VCs) 
can choose to go public through an IPO.121 Following the IPO, 
 
116 See Fried & Ganor, supra note 108, at 994; see also id. at 995 
(“Liquidity events promise a certain payout, much of which the preferred 
shareholders can capture through their liquidation preferences. Continuing 
to operate the firm as an independent company may expose the preferred-
owning VCs to risk without sufficient opportunity for gain.”).  
117 See id. at 994–95. 
118 See id. at 983 (“If the firm does poorly, the founder will therefore get 
less than her pro rata share of the firm’s value, and nothing at all if the 
firm’s value is less than the liquidation preference. If the firm does well, and 
the VCs convert into common, the founder receives her pro rata share of the 
firm’s value. Thus, founders may have a greater incentive to increase 
startup value than they would under an all-common capital structure.”). 
119 See generally Daniel M. Cable & Scott Shane, A Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Approach to Entrepreneur-Venture Capitalist Relationships, 22 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 142 (1997); D. Gordon Smith, Team Production in Venture 
Capital Investing, 24 J. CORP. L. 949, 960 (1999). 
120 See Smith, supra note 14, at 595.  
121 For a discussion on the motives to go public, see Richard A. Booth, 
The Limited Liability Company and the Search for a Bright Line Between 
Corporations and Partnerships, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 79, 89–92 (1997); 
see also James C. Brau & Stanley E. Fawcett, Initial Public Offerings: An 
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the founders are often replaced with professional managers, 
and the VC-controlled board is replaced with independent 
directors. The capital providers and employees are able to 
liquidate their investments in the firm.  
Second, the board can decide to sell to another firm. In that 
case, the capital providers are able to cash out according to 
their preference, but the common shareholders, such as 
employees, often do not receive much of the profit from the 
sale, depending on the sale price. Indeed, their unexercised 
options may be cancelled without receiving anything in 
return, even for in-the-money options.122 
Third, the start-up can be liquidated. As with a sale, VCs 
are able to cash out according to their liquidation preference, 
but again, the common shareholders, such as employees, are 
unlikely to receive much of the liquidation proceeds. 
2. Mitigation of Asymmetric Information and 
Agency Costs 
Venture capital firms are also able to use their preferred 
stock to mitigate agency costs and information asymmetry. In 
any startup, there is uncertainty concerning the success of the 
startup firm’s product or service.123 In turn, this affects the 
motivation of investors to advance capital and of suppliers to 
extend credit.  
Startup firms traditionally experience difficulty raising 
capital from investors due to the uncertainty of success and 
 
Analysis of Theory and Practice, 61 J. FIN. 399 (2006) (discussing a survey 
on decisions to do an IPO). 
122 See supra note 121. 
123 See Anat Alon-Beck, The Law of Social Entrepreneurship—Creating 
Shared Value Through the Lens of Sandra Day O’Connor’s iCivics 20 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 520, 536 (2018). (“[The] information asymmetry and uncertainty 
associated with agency issues contribute to ‘adverse selection,’ where 
impact investors have difficulty screening and selecting credible, high-
quality entrepreneurs and companies, inhibiting investors’ ability to make 
sound and competent investment decisions.”). According to Jensen and 
Meckling’s “agency theory,” there is always uncertainty surrounding the 
agent’s (or entrepreneur’s) possible mismanagement and opportunistic 
conduct. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 51.  
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the asymmetric information problem. As outsiders, 
prospective investors do not have the same knowledge about 
a firm’s outlook as the entrepreneurs who work within the 
firm and are responsible for decision-making.  
Investment in entrepreneurial firms is an investment in 
intangible assets, such as ideas, talents or trade secrets.124 It 
is very hard to value the intangible assets involved. Further, 
in the event of default, intangible assets are worthless to 
investors.125 Stock options are used as a signaling tool to the 
investors and outside market to help mitigate the information 
asymmetry problem. To reduce moral hazard employees and 
managers are given certain percentages in the company in the 
form of stock options, as part of their compensation package.  
C. The Shift in Employee Expectations & Labor 
Contract Renegotiation  
United States tech companies are engaged in a war for 
talent,126 and unicorn firms in particular experience difficulty 
with attracting, engaging, and retaining talent.127 The shift in 
employee expectations is evident from the frequent reissue or 
revision of equity grants and unicorn management’s 
experimentation with alternative organizational strategies to 
try to provide liquidity opportunities to employees and early 
investors. As noted, due to these changes, unicorn employees 
now realize that although they are “rich on paper,” they 
cannot liquidate and reap the benefits of their hard work.128  
To illustrate, Uber,129 the largest unicorn firm in the 
United States, has one of the highest turnover rates of 
 
124 See Alon-Beck, supra note 123, at 536–37.  
125 See Lindsey, supra note 50, at 1137; see also GOMPERS & LERNER, 
supra note 49, at 128 (discussing the nature of the entrepreneur’s asset, 
which affect her firm’s financial and corporate strategy).  
126 See Elizabeth G. Chambers et al., supra note 16, at 46; see also 
Ovide, supra note 15.  
127 See Efrati & Schultz, supra note 11.  
128 See infra Section III.C. 
129 Employees who joined Uber at its founding in 2009 are probably 
locked in due to its over-valuation. Though rich on paper, they cannot 
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knowledgeable employees130 despite offering its talent, on 
average, the highest annual salary, including the highest 
equity award, among tech companies.131 Software engineers 
at Uber are, on average, better compensated than those at 
Google,132 Microsoft,133 Amazon.com134 and Apple.135 Uber is 
not the only unicorn that experiences high turnover, but is 
leading “the race to the bottom, with 1.2 years of average 
employee tenure.”136  
Thanks to online data sites, such as Glassdoor and PaySa, 
as well as news sites like CNBC, there are many public 
reports about the fact that unicorn employees, especially Uber 
employees, complain about the extreme capital lock-in and 
illiquidity of their stock options.137 On March 6, 2017, the 
Financial Times reported that Uber competitors have seen “an 
 
liquidate. Additionally, if they joined in 2009, now, in 2019, their options 
will soon expire under the Tax Code, and the company cannot extend them. 
See generally supra notes 33–40. 
130 According to The Information’s Average Software Engineer 
Compensation chart, Airbnb pays an average annual equity compensation 
of $158,000, and Uber pays an average annual equity compensation of 
$157,000. Efrati & Schultz, supra note 11.  
131 According to The Information’s Average Software Engineer 
Compensation chart, Uber pays a software engineer, on average, an annual 
equity compensation of $157,000. In comparison, on average, Google pays 
$59,000, Microsoft pays $40,000, Amazon pays $33,000, and Apple pays 
$39,000. Id.  
132 Google pays a software engineer an average base salary of $132,000, 
an average annual equity compensation of $59,000, an average annual 
bonus of $22,000, and an average signing bonus of $20,000 (total: $233,000). 
Id. 
133 Microsoft pays an average base salary of $135,000, an average 
annual equity compensation of $40,000, an average annual bonus of 
$30,000, and an average signing bonus of $17,000 (total: $222,000). Id.  
134 Amazon pays an average base salary of $121,000, an average annual 
equity compensation of $33,000, an average annual bonus of $19,000, and 
an average signing bonus of $30,000 (total: $203,000). Id.  
135 Apple pays an average base salary of $127,000, an average annual 
equity compensation of $39,000, an average annual bonus of $20,000, and 
an average signing bonus of $22,000 total: $208,000). Id. 
136 Paysa Team, supra note 40; see also Efrati & Schultz, supra note 11.  
137 See Samuelson, supra note 28.  
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uptick in job applications from Uber employees, as its workers 
lose faith in the company’s leadership and start to doubt the 
value of their stock options.”138 Uber is the largest technology 
firm in Silicon Valley139 and historically, like many other 
California firms, has been able to retain its employees by 
offering them equity and stock options, thereby binding them 
with golden handcuffs.140  
Unicorn firms are no longer as rare and are growing at a 
rapid pace around the world. The United States has the 
largest concentration of unicorns in the world141 and around 
“$700 billion in unrealized value is currently locked up in 
unicorns.”142 In 2017 alone, “22% of the capital invested in the 
US was part of a deal valuing a company at $1 billion or 
more.”143  
 
138 Leslie Hook, Uber Employees Lose Faith and Explore Exit, FIN. 
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/c6bc4b2c-0012-11e7-8d8e-
a5e3738f9ae4 [https://perma.cc/3TCW-RE3M].  
139 See supra note 33. 
140 Merriam Webster defines “golden handcuffs” as “special benefits 
offered to an employee as an inducement to continue service,” with the first 
known use by 1976. Golden Handcuffs, MERRIAM WEBSTER, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/golden%20handcuffs 
[https://perma.cc/69NF-L595]; see also Booth, supra note 21, at 271. For 
further accounts of Uber’s use of golden handcuffs, see Dan Primack, Uber 
Plays Hardball with Early Shareholders, FORTUNE (June 20, 2014), 
http://fortune.com/2014/06/20/uber-plays-hardball-with-early-
shareholders/ [https://perma.cc/7S5C-TYGE]; Dan Primack, Early ‘Unicorn’ 
Employees Can’t Always Cash In, FORTUNE (Aug. 19, 2014), 
http://fortune.com/2014/08/19/early-unicorn-employees-cant-always-cash-
in/ [https://perma.cc/4XPU-SWRE]. 
141 See PITCHBOOK, supra note 9 (“The aggregate valuation of unicorns 
stood at just $35 billion in 2009, but has grown more than 20x since.”). For 
the latest list of unicorn companies, see The Global Unicorn Club, CB 
INSIGHTS, https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies 
[https://perma.cc/RL7L-W9RL]. 
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These firms are growing “twice as fast as those founded a 
decade ago.”144 Due to this fast-paced growth, founders and 
managers of unicorn firms are dealing with critical problems 
of getting big fast.145 One such problem associated with 
expanding from a small startup team to a large unicorn with 
thousands of employees is the fight to recruit, engage, and 
retain a motivated work force.146 However, the unicorn firm’s 
and its employees’ short-term economic interests are in clear 
conflict.  
First, unicorn employees now experience capital or 
“investor” lock-in.147 Capital lock-in refers to when equity 
investors in a corporation are not able to withdraw or 
“redeem” the capital that they contributed.148 They cannot 
force the corporation to distribute assets or buy back their 
shares.149  
 
144 How Unicorns Grow, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2016, at 28, 28 
(“Firms founded from 2012 to 2015 had a time to market cap more than 
twice that of firms founded from 2000 to 2003.”).  
145 See Zach Cutler, 4 Big Challenges That Startups Face, 
ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 11, 2014), https://www.entrepreneur.com/ 
article/240742 [https://perma.cc/UZ83-2LYU]. See generally Wickham 
Skinner, Big Hat, No Cattle: Managing Human Resources, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Sept.–Oct. 1981, at 106. 
146 Until employees exercise their options, they cannot vote on how the 
firm will operate, and many times, even after they exercise, their voting 
rights are marginal. Therefore, due to the large size of unicorn startups, 
stock-holding employees have no control over the company’s strategy or 
senior managements’ actions.  
147 See Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. 
L. REV. 1, 7 (2012) (introducing the term “investor lock-in”). This lock-in 
effect is due to the fact that founders, senior management, and some 
investors are not in a rush to do an IPO. See Kupor, supra note 3, on the 
decline in IPOs.  
148 See Ibrahim, supra note 147, at 6–7; see also Margaret M. Blair, 
Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us, 1 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 1, 26 (2004).  
149 See Ibrahim, supra note 147, at 6; see also Blair, supra note 148, at 
14, 26 (citing early corporate charters and statutes that limited withdrawals 
to formal corporate dissolution).  
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Corporate law scholars have debated the desirability of 
this capital lock-in. Some scholars, such as Margaret Blair, 
maintain that capital lock-in is desirable because it assures 
firm stability, as investors do not have the power to withdraw 
their capital easily.150 In contrast, scholars including Larry 
Ribstein and Darian Ibrahim maintain that capital lock-in 
raises agency costs, as investors do not have a way of 
disciplining the firm’s managers by threatening to withdraw 
their capital from the firm,151 which further contributes to 
governance problems within the firm. 
Unicorn employees become common shareholders when 
they exercise their options. As common shareholders, they do 
not have downside protection. Therefore, their common shares 
will be last in line to be paid, even if there is a sale in the 
future.152 The experience of Good Technology (“Good”) 
employee compensation illustrates the problems that arise 
when this lack of downside protection is combined with the 
lock-in issues described above.153  
Good was a unicorn startup that filed for an IPO in May 
2014 but eventually postponed it and never completed the 
process.154 In March 2015, Good’s board of directors declined 
an acquisition offer for $825 million due to their desire to go 
public.155 After running into financial distress, Good 
 
150 See Blair, supra note 148, at 43. According to Blair, capital lock-in 
allows the firm to attract not only investors but also “skilled employees[.]” 
Id.  
151 See Larry E. Ribstein, Should History Lock in Lock-in?, 41 TULSA L. 
REV. 523, 524–25 (2006); see also Ibrahim, supra note 147, at 6–7.  
152 A sale of a startup is more likely to happen today than an IPO. See 
3 Data Points that Suggest the IPO Market May Never Come Back, CB 
INSIGHTS (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/tech-ipo-dead/ 
[https://perma.cc/3BM3-JVJ9] (“Despite regular yearnings for an IPO 
comeback, it might be time to accept that it’s not going to happen.”). 
153 See Cable, supra note 5, at 614–16.  
154 See Matt Levine, Opinion, Good Technology Wasn’t So Good for 
Employees, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
opinion/articles/2015-12-23/good-technology-wasn-t-so-good-for-employees 
(on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
155 See id. 
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ultimately sold for almost half this value, $425 million, in 
September 2015.156 News of the sale came as a shock to Good’s 
employees, who “discovered their Good stock was valued at 44 
cents a share, down from $4.32 a year earlier.”157 
Good’s preferred shareholders were able to recover their 
investment. However, Good’s employees, who were common 
shareholders, “ended up paying to work” for Good.158 Some 
employees had taken on loans to pay for the taxes to exercise 
their stock options, but never profited from that investment 
as the loan amounts were much larger than what their stock 
was worth after the sale.  
It should be noted that, prior to the sale, Good allowed its 
employees to trade their stock on the secondary markets. 
Some of Good’s employees did not use the secondary market 
as an exit vehicle, but instead purchased additional Good 
stock on these platforms as they believed in the company’s 
success and in the board’s desire to follow-through with an 
IPO. Good exhibits the risks caused by information 
asymmetry: employee-investors not only took on loans to 
exercise their options, but even bought additional shares on 
the secondary market because they believed in the company 
and had no idea about its financial distress.  
This example illustrates how important IPOs are as an exit 
tool for unicorn employees. IPOs allow employees to start a 
new firm or join a new startup and relax the employees’ 
financial constraints.159 Unfortunately, as explained in Part 
III, there has been a steady decline in IPOs.  
 
156 See id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 See Tania Babina, Paige Ouimet & Rebecca Zarutskie, Going 
Entrepreneurial? IPOs and New Firm Creation (Div. of Research & 
Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve Bd., Financial & Economic 
Discussion Series, No. 2017-022, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940133 
[https://perma.cc/AB6R-DMH8]. Babina et al.’s results suggest a new 
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III. PRIVATE MARKETS ARE THE NEW PUBLIC 
MARKETS  
A variety of market conditions contribute to the rise in 
unicorn firms, which no longer follow the traditional 
trajectory of a high growth startup or grow as “incubators for 
tomorrow’s publicly held corporations.”160 The corporate 
patterns and theories observed today are not merely products 
and consequences of technology or development narratives, 
but lie in politics and economic philosophy as well.161 
Section III.A explains the decline of the U.S. public 
corporation and public markets and Section III.B presents 
some changes to legislation that facilitate the raising of 
private capital.  
A. Decline in IPOs 
Recently, there has been a sharp decline in IPOs in the 
United States, which makes “our public capital markets . . . 
less attractive to growing businesses than in the past,” 
according to Jay Clayton, Chairman of the SEC.162 
Policymakers, regulators, investors, academics163 and the 
 
160 Rock & Wachter, supra note 13, at 914.  
161 An examination of classic corporate governance theory 
demonstrates that “the public corporation is as much a political adaptation 
as an economic or technological necessity.” Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory 
of American Corporation Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 10 (1991).  
162 Jay Clayton, Testimony on “Oversight of the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission,” SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 26, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-clayton-2017-09-26#_ftn1 
[https://perma.cc/6JDX-U9TK ]  
163 There are many theories that try to explain the decline in IPOs. See 
generally Francesco Bova, Miguel Minutti-Meza, Gordon Richardson & 
Dushyantkumar Vyas, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Exit Strategies of 
Private Firms, 31 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 818 (2014); see also Renee M. Jones, 
Essay, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165, 170 
(2017) (showing that new regulations caused a corporate governance 
problem, by creating unicorns that are not subject to the oversight of the 
market or supervised by regular private company investors). Bova and 
others claim that the expense of regulatory compliance with the 2002 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) is a factor in the decline of IPOs. See Sarbanes 
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press are concerned about the present decline.164 To illustrate 
this decline, during the dot-com peak in 1996, more than 8000 
domestic public companies were listed on a U.S. stock 
exchange.165 The number was down to 3618 companies by the 
end of 2016.166  
In the United States, the volume of IPOs is a measure of 
success of the innovation economy.167 Innovation has a very 
 
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). Compliance with 
the SOX requirements shifted the incentive for private firms. The new exit 
strategy of private firms is to be acquired by a public acquirer, as opposed 
to doing an IPO. See Bova et al., supra. On the other hand, the following 
scholars argue that SOX and other early-2000s regulatory changes are not 
the cause for the decline in small firm IPOs. See Doidge et al., The U.S. Left 
Behind, supra note 6, at 569; Doidge et al., The U.S. Listing Gap, supra note 
6, at 486; Gao et al., supra note 6, at 1690; Paul Rose & Steven Davidoff 
Solomon, Where Have All the IPOs Gone? The Hard Life of the Small IPO, 6 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 83, 86–87 (2016).  
164 See Frank Partnoy, The Death of the IPO, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/private-
inequity/570808/ [https://perma.cc/BSY7-6N7M]; Steven Davidoff Solomon, 
A Dearth of I.P.O.s, but It’s Not the Fault of Red Tape, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/business/dealbook/fewer-ipos-
regulation-stock-market.html [https://perma.cc/ABD6-FGCR]. 
165 See DAVID BROWN, JEFF GRABOW, CHRIS HOLMES & JACKIE KELLEY, 
ERNST & YOUNG LLP, LOOKING BEHIND THE DECLINING NUMBER OF PUBLIC 
COMPANIES: AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN THE US CAPITAL MARKETS 2 (2017) 
[hereinafter EY REPORT], https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/an-
analysis-of-trends-in-the-us-capital-markets/$FILE/ey-an-analysis-of-
trends-in-the-us-capital-markets.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NF7-MDF6] (“US 
listings hit a record high of more than 8,000 domestically incorporated 
companies listed on a US stock exchange with an average market 
capitalization of $1.8b in today’s dollars”).  
166 Doidge et al., Eclipse of the Public Corporation, supra note 6, at 8. 
This number decreased quickly through 2003, to 5295 domestic U.S.-listed 
companies. EY REPORT, supra note 165, at 2 (“The loss of domestic US-listed 
companies in 1996–2003 represents 74% of the loss from 1996 to date.”).  
167 Shai Bernstein, Innovator’s Dilemma: IPO or No?, THIRD WAY.ORG 
(Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.thirdway.org/report/innovators-dilemma-ipo-
or-no (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review); see also ANDREW 
METRICK & AYAKO YASUDA, VENTURE CAPITAL & THE FINANCE OF INNOVATION 
(2d ed. 2011); Craig Doidge et al., Eclipse of the Public Corporation, supra 
note 6; Xiaohui Gao, et al., supra note 6; Manju Puri & Rebecca Zarutskie, 
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important role in promoting growth, according to Solow’s 
economic growth theory.168 Solow postulated that 
technological innovation is the only reliable engine that can 
drive change and is the fundamental source of sustained 
productivity and growth.169 Until recently, an IPO exit was 
believed to be the ultimate entrepreneur founder’s dream and 
one of the greatest achievements in the lifecycle of a startup 
company. What changed? 
During the IPO process the startup company transforms 
from a privately held corporation to one that is publicly traded 
on an exchange with dispersed ownership. This 
transformation allows a startup company to raise large 
amounts of capital from the public markets. A company’s 
transition to public equity markets also may affect its ability 
to attract human capital.170 After an IPO, the company will 
gain improved access to capital, and the use of stock options 
may enable firms to attract new human capital.171  
As noted above, startup firms typically experience 
informational and financial barriers to raising capital.172 This 
is especially true following a financial crisis. Such difficulties 
are the product of uncertainty, high risk, and information 
asymmetry problems, and in the past precluded non-VC 
investors from backing such firms.173 Therefore, academic 
 
On the Life Cycle Dynamics of Venture-Capital-and Non-Venture-Capital-
Financed Firms, 67 J. FIN. 2247 (2012); Brian J. Broughman & Jesse M. 
Fried, Do Founders Control Start-Up Firms That Go Public? 3 (European 
Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper, No. 405/2018, 2018). 
168 See Robert M. Solow, Growth Theory and After, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 
307, 309 (1988). 
169 See id. 
170 See, e.g., Shai Bernstein, Does Going Public Affect Innovation?, 70 J. 
FIN. 1365, 1398 (2015). 
171 However, retention of key employees (inventors) may become 
difficult as options are vested, ownership is diluted, and changes in firm 
governance affect employees. See id.  
172 See supra Section II.B.2. 
173 See BRANSCOMB & AUERSWALD, supra note 48, at 14–16. 
 
  
No. 1:107] UNICORN STOCK OPTIONS 147 
literature has focused on VCs as an important source of 
financing startups over the last thirty years.174 
Recently, however, there has been a dramatic increase in 
alternative financing vehicles, and new market trends have 
developed in conjunction with, and sometimes in response to, 
the difficulty of obtaining VC investments. New market 
participants such as mutual funds and sovereign wealth funds 
now invest large amounts of capital in unicorn firms.175 This 
Article introduces these new players176 and describes the 
market dynamics that contribute to the trend toward unicorn 
firms delaying their IPOs.177  
There is a heated debate in Silicon Valley about whether 
the use of golden handcuffs is fair due to these new market 
dynamics.178 Traditional stock option contracts were based on 
the principle that it will take a startup about four years to go 
public; however, startups today are staying private longer, 
 
174 See Paul Gompers, William Gornall, Steven N. Kaplan & Ilya A. 
Strebulaev, How Do Venture Capitalists Make Decisions? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22587, 2016).  
175 See Sungjoung Kwon, Michelle Lowry & Yiming Qian, Mutual Fund 
Investments in Private Firms 1 (Sept. 20, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941203 [perma.cc/B65L-4W4S]. 
176 Chernenko et al. show that: 
[O]ver the 2010–2016 period, the number of distinct funds 
directly investing in unicorns has increased from less than 
10 to more than 140. . . . The dollar value of aggregate 
holdings has also increased by an order of magnitude, from 
less than $1 billion to more than $8 billion. These results 
paint a consistent picture of unicorn investments becoming 
a more important part of the portfolios of open-end mutual 
funds. 
Chernenko et al., supra note 4, at 20; see also William Gornall & Ilya A. 
Strebulaev, Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with Reality 2 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23895, 2017) (“A number of 
the largest U.S. mutual fund providers, such as Fidelity Investments and T. 
Rowe Price, have begun investing their assets directly in unicorns.”). 
177 Kwon et al., supra note 175, at 2. Kwon et al. further show that these 
large amounts of capital “should enable companies to stay private longer.” 
Id. at 27.  
178 See infra Part IV.  
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averaging about eleven years.179 This delay causes lock-in and 
illiquidity for unicorn shares. Additionally, because unicorn 
valuations are very high prior to IPOs, options are often 
prohibitively expensive to exercise for some employees. 
Unicorns accordingly face pressure to seek alternative 
employee compensation mechanisms and contractual 
arrangements.180 
Unicorn employees are faced with a dilemma—if their 
options are expiring (or if they leave the firm), they must 
choose between forfeiting their options and thereby reducing 
their chances of getting rich (thus forfeiting a significant 
portion of the compensation package to which they initially 
agreed), or exercising their options and paying taxes on profit 
that may never materialize. 
As a result of this crisis, the National Venture Capital 
Association and Palantir Technologies lobbied Congress on 
both the House and Senate versions of the “Empowering 
Employees through Stock Ownership Act.”181 The purpose of 
the Act was to provide an extended deferral period and to ease 
the tax burden to employees.182 The material portions of these 
bills are included in section 13603 of the new Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act (the “Tax Act”).183 New section 83(i) of the Internal 
Revenue Code allows certain individuals to elect to defer for 
up to five years.184 This legislation is part of a broader push 
 
179 Gao et al., supra note 6; Doidge et al., Eclipse of the Public 
Corporation, supra note 6. 
180 See supra Section III.C. 
181 Francine McKenna, Unicorn Lobby Pushes Back on Stock-Option 





183 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97 § 13603, 31 Stat. 2054, 
2159–64 (2017). 
184 New Internal Revenue Code section 83(i) allows certain individuals 
to elect to defer recognizing income on qualified stock options and restricted 
stock units for up to five years. I.R.C. § 83(i) (West 2017). The new rule 
evolved from a 2016 Senate bill, sponsored by Senators Mark Warner and 
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by unicorns to encourage their employees to receive equity 
compensation. 
Is the IPO market broken? Scholars such as Gao, Ritter, 
and Zhu, maintain that it is not.185 On the contrary, despite 
fewer U.S. offerings today than in the mid-90s, average 
annual proceeds from U.S. IPOs have greatly increased.186 
Today’s public companies not only raise more capital; they are 
also more stable, as evidenced by fewer de-listings.187  
This Article does not take a stance on whether the IPO 
market is broken or not. Rather, building on the works of de 
Fontenay,188 Fried and Broughman,189 and Ewens and Farre-
Mensa,190 it adopts the view that there are multiple factors 
that contribute to the decline in IPOs. This Article instead 
focuses on the factors that contributed to the rise in unicorn 
startup firms, especially factors that influence founders’ 
decisions to go public or continue to grow while staying 
private.191  
 
Dean Heller, the Empowering Employees Through Stock Ownership Act, S. 
3152, 114th Cong. (2016) and a companion House bill, H.R. 5719, 114th 
Cong. (2016). The purpose was to provide an extended deferral period of up 
to seven years for employees who exercise options to buy the stock of private 
companies to ease the tax burden arising from equity grants covering shares 
that are not publicly traded. See McKenna, supra note 181. 
185 See Gao et al., supra note 6, at 1691.  
186 EY REPORT, supra note 165, at 2.  
187 See id. 
188 See de Fontenay, supra note 3, at 448 (“[W]hile critics blame the 
increase in regulation for the decline of public equity, the ongoing 
deregulation of private capital raising arguably played the greater role.”).  
189 See Broughman & Fried, supra note 167, at 2. According to 
Broughman and Fried, Mark Zuckerberg is not the rule, but rather the 
exception. Id. at 1. They prove, contrary to traditional finance theory, 
especially Black & Gilson’s “call option on control” theory linking VC and 
stock markets, that the “ex ante likelihood of founders reacquiring control 
at IPO is extremely low[.]” Id. at 2. They focus on control that is both strong 
(where “founders have enough voting power to ensure they remain in the 
saddle”) and durable (control that lasts at least three years). Id. at 2, 6–7. 
190 Ewens & Farre-Mensa, supra note 18, at 7. 
191 Empirical evidence suggests that active markets actually have a 
negative effect on innovative investment strategies. See Daniel Ferreira, 
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B. New Equity Capital Providers 
The institutional private market is robust and expanding, 
and “private markets are the new public markets,” according 
to Matt Levine.192 Unicorn firms now regularly raise 
substantial funding from investors who traditionally invested 
in public companies,193 such as large U.S. mutual funds (e.g. 
Fidelity and T. Rowe Price)194 and sovereign wealth funds 
from China, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other countries.195 
Fidelity, for example, holds the second-highest number of 
unicorns in any portfolio.196 Fidelity joins new and existing 
market players: VCs, private equity, angel investors,197 
 
Gustavo Manso & André C. Silva, Incentives to Innovate and the Decision to 
Go Public or Private, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 256, 256 (2014) (“[I]t is optimal to 
go public when exploiting existing ideas and optimal to go private when 
exploring new ideas.”); see also Filippo Belloc, Innovation in State-Owned 
Enterprises: Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom, 48 J. ECON. ISSUES 
821, 827 (2014) (“[P]ublicly traded securities require disclosure of all the 
relevant information and their market prices quickly react to business 
successes and failures, thereby encouraging insiders to choose conventional 
projects.”).  
192 Matt Levine, Opinion, Something Is Lost When Companies Stay 
Private, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/ 
articles/2018-04-04/something-is-lost-when-companies-stay-private (on file 
with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
193 See Chernenko et al., supra note 4, at 2; see also Gornall & 
Strebulaev, supra note 176, at 2; Kwon et al., supra note 175, at 37.  
194 Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 176, at 2.  
195 See PITCHBOOK, supra note 9, at 4–5.  
196 See id.; see also Jeff Schwartz, Should Mutual Funds Invest in 
Startups? A Case Study of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s Investments in 
Unicorns (and Other Startups) and the Regulatory Implications, 95 N.C. L. 
REV. 1341, 1343 (2017).  
197 See MARK VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBERT J. ROBINSON, ANGEL 
INVESTING: MATCHING STARTUP FUNDS WITH STARTUP COMPANIES 5 (2000); 
Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 
717, 739 (2010) (“[I]nformal angel investing financed many of the 
foundational start-ups in Silicon Valley and Route 128.”). 
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clusters of angel investors,198 corporate venture capital,199 
crowdfunding platforms,200 sovereign wealth funds, and other 
institutional investors, who are aggressively investing large 
amounts of capital in emerging growth companies.201 In 
particular, mutual funds have significantly expanded their 
investments in unicorns since 2010.202 Chernenko, Lerner, 
and Zeng show that “over the 2010–2016 period, the number 
of distinct funds directly investing in unicorns has increased 
 
198 See FAQs for Angels & Entrepreneurs, ANGEL CAP. ASS’N, 
https://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/faqs/#What_are_angel_groups_ 
[https://perma.cc/RAG3-6RJW] (“Many angel groups co-invest with other 
angel groups, individual angels and early-stage venture capitalists to make 
investments of $500,000 to $2 million per round.”); see also Benjamin 
Gomes-Casseres, Alliances, Inter-firm, ROUTLEDGE ENCYC. OF INT’L POL. 
ECON. 27 (R. J. Barry Jones ed., 2001) (“An ‘inter-firm alliance’ is an 
organizational structure established to govern an incomplete contract 
between separate firms and in which each firm has limited control.”); Robert 
Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 54 
ANTITRUST L.J. 893 (1985); T George Harris, The Post-Capitalist Executive: 
An Interview with Peter F. Drucker, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1993, at 
114, 116 (“Today businesses grow through alliances, all kinds of dangerous 
liaisons and joint ventures, which, by the way, very few people 
understand.”); Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Corporate 
Governance and Innovation: Venture Capital, Joint Ventures, and Family 
Businesses (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 65/2006, 
2006) (discussing corporate governance for joint ventures). 
199 See Ronald W. Masulis & Rajarishi Nahata, Financial Contracting 
with Strategic Investors: Evidence from Corporate Venture Capital Backed 
IPOs, 18 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 599, 627 (2009) (“[L]ead CVCs have lower 
board representation than lead traditional VCs, which is consistent with the 
entrepreneur’s desire to limit CVC influence, particularly at the earliest 
stages of a start-up’s life.”); Henry W. Chesbrough, Making Sense of 
Corporate Venture Capital, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2002, at 90, 92 (“[The] 
definition excludes investments made through an external fund managed 
by a third party, even if the investment vehicle is funded by and specifically 
designed to meet the objectives of a single investing company.”). 
200 See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Securities Crowdfunding 
and Investor Protection, CESIFO DICE REP., Summer 2016, at 11, 
http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/dice-report-2016-2-heminway-june.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C3RV-D23F]. 
201 See EY REPORT, supra note 165, at 8.  
202 Kwon et al., supra note 175, at 1.  
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from less than 10 to more than 140.”203 Kwon, Lowery, and 
Qian add that unicorn startups are now able to raise large 
amounts of capital from mutual funds, and this capital should 
enable the “companies to stay private longer.”204 Moreover, 
mutual funds currently hold more than $8 billion in unicorn 
firms, and this number is increasing.205 Clearly, unicorn 
investments are “becoming a more important part of the 
portfolios of open-end mutual funds.”206 
 The entrance of these new players changes the 
equilibrium, allowing founders to demand more founder-
friendly rounds. Raising capital for a startup company—even 
if it is located in Silicon Valley and is backed by a VC—is an 
extremely risky and challenging endeavor.207  
The investments of mutual funds thus enable unicorn 
founders to stay private longer, which founders prefer in order 
to maintain control over the firm and to continue investing in 
innovation. There is evidence that the social return on 
research and development (especially early stage technology 
development) is much higher than the private return on such 
 
203 Chernenko et al., supra note 4, at 20.  
204 Kwon et al., supra note 175, at 2.  
205 Chernenko et al., supra note 4, at 20 (“The dollar value of aggregate 
holdings has also increased by an order of magnitude, from less than $1 
billion to more than $8 billion.”); see also Gornall & Strabulaev, supra note 
176, at 2 (“While the total present VC exposure of mutual funds, at around 
$7 billion, is small compared to the size of the mutual fund industry, there 
has been a tenfold increase in just three years.”). 
206 See Chernenko et al., supra note 4, at 20; see also Gornall & 
Strabulaev, supra note 176. Additionally, third-party equity marketplaces 
such as EquityZen allow individual investors to gain direct exposure to 
these unicorns. See Vedant Suri, Unicorns, Dinosaurs & The Elephant 
Room – An Update on the Tech Animal Kingdom, EQUITYZEN (Aug. 19, 
2015), https://equityzen.com/knowledge-center/blog/update-tech-animal-
kingdom [https://perma.cc/ES6X-RZ3J]. 
207 Ola Bengtsson & John R.M. Hand, CEO Compensation in Venture-
Backed Firms, 26 J. BUS. VENTURING 391, 410 (2011) (“Without multiple 
injections of new capital, a firm of the type backed by venture capital is 
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investment.208 Private investment allows the firm’s founder to 
defer the costs associated with going public209 and avoid the 
pressures associated with being a public company,210 
especially pressures to not invest in innovation and focus on 
 
208 See Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D Spillovers, 94 SCANDINAVIAN 
J. ECON. 29, 32 (Supp. 1992).  
209 Kwon et al., supra note 175, at 27. On the regulatory costs of going 
public, see generally Anne Beyer, Daniel A. Cohen, Thomas Z. Lys & 
Beverly R. Walther, The Financial Reporting Environment: Review of the 
Recent Literature, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 296 (2010).  
210 Another plausible cause for the rise of the unicorn firms is that 
lucrative technology companies choose to stay private as long as possible in 
order to escape the pressures toward short-term strategies that stem from 
public ownership. See The Endangered Public Company, ECONOMIST (May 
19, 2012), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2012/05/19/the-endangered-
public-company. [https://perma.cc/7HJS-6T5Z]; see also LYNN STOUT, THE 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS 
INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 7 (2012) (asserting the short-
term focus of investors and corporate boards is currently one of the key 
issues in the corporate governance debate); Thomas J. Chemmanur & 
Yawen Jiao, Dual Class IPOs: A Theoretical Analysis, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 
305, 316 (2012). For discussion on shareholder value, see COLIN MAYER, 
FIRM COMMITMENT (2013); see also Ira M. Millstein, Re-Examining Board 
Priorities in an Era of Activism, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2013) 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/re-examining-board-priorities-in-
an-era-of-activism/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/T434-PFH8] (“[C]orporate 
boards around the country should re-examine their priorities and figure out 
to whom they owe their fiduciary duties.”); see also STOUT, supra, at 7. Stout 
also expresses this concern with regards to the innovation ability of large 
public companies. See Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as a Time Machine: 
Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate 
Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 710–11 (2015); see also John Armour, 
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
(3d ed. 2017); David Ciepley, Beyond Public And Private: Toward a Political 
Theory of the Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 148–49 (2013); Bill 
Buxton, The Price of Forgoing Basic Research, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2008), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2008-12-17/the-price-of-forgoing-
basic-researchbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-
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short-term results.211 As a result of the entrance of these new 
market players, unicorn founders now have more leverage to 
negotiate founder friendly rounds with venture capital firms, 
who continue to play an important role in the governance 
structure of startup firms.212  
Policymakers, regulators, and scholars should take these 
new market trends into account and advance the traditional 
entrepreneurship literature, which has focused on VCs as the 
dominant source of financing start-ups over the last thirty 
years.213 Future research or other papers can address the 
question of mutual funds’ and sovereign wealth funds’ 
incentives for investing in early stage technology development 
when they cannot capture the full benefits of such 
technologies.214 
C. Changes to Governance Structure of Unicorns 
New entrepreneurial startup firms aspire to receive VC 
backing and become the next Apple, Facebook, Cisco, Google, 
 
211 Kwon et al., supra note 175, at 38. See also John Asker, Joan Farre-
Mensa & Alexander Ljungqvist, Corporate Investment and Stock Market 
Listing: A Puzzle?, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 342, 346 (2015) (showing empirical 
results that private firms invest substantially more than public ones, and 
that private firms’ investment decisions are around four times more 
responsive to changes in investment opportunities than are those of public 
firms).  
212 See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the 
False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 44 (2006) 
(proposing a new dynamic agency cost model of the firm). 
213 See Gompers et al., supra note 174, at 2. 
214 See, e.g., BRANSCOMB & AUERSWALD, supra note 48, at 14–15; 
Bronwyn H. Hall, The Private and Social Returns to Research and 
Development, in TECHNOLOGY, R&D, AND THE ECONOMY 140, 159–60 (Bruce 
L.R. Smith & Claude E. Barfield eds., 1996) (providing evidence that the 
social return to R&D is much above the private return); Griliches, supra 
note 208, at 32–33 (evaluating calculations of the social rates of return for 
research and development); Yoram Margalioth, Not a Panacea for Economic 
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or Intel.215 VC-backed startups are the primary force in the 
economy responsible for both job creation and economic 
growth.216 
Furthermore, according to Gompers and Lerner,217 if a 
startup firm does not have VC backing, the chances are high 
(approximately ninety percent) that the firm will fail within 
three years from its formation.218  
Many scholars consider the American-VC market an 
essential element of the U.S. national innovation system, and 
it has been extensively imitated around the world.219 By 
financing capital hungry young start-ups, who present 
abundant hazards and uncertainties that often deter other 
“regular” investors, VC investors continue to help to promote 
innovation in the U.S. (and around the world.)220  
The ways in which VCs fund innovation dominates the 
entrepreneurial finance literature.221 A skillful VC fund will 
 
215 See Mary J. Dent, A Rose by Any Other Name: How Labels Get in 
the Way of U.S. Innovation Policy, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 128, 134 (2011). 
216 See id. at 134–35. 
217 See Lerner & Gompers, supra note 48 (“For newly launched 
enterprises without venture capital backing, failure is almost assured: 
nearly 90 percent fail within three years.”).  
218 Id. This alarming study illustrates the authenticity of a well-known 
expression about the financing gap in the startup world called the “valley of 
death.” See supra note 48. It refers to the difficulty of entrepreneurs to cover 
the negative cash flow in the early stages of their startup firm, before their 
new product or service is commercialized and brings in revenue from real 
customers or investors. See generally id. 
219 See David H. Hsu & Martin Kenney, Organizing Venture Capital: 
The Rise and Demise of American Research & Development Corporation, 
1946–1973, 14 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 579, 579 (2005). 
220 VCs face similar hazards and uncertainties. According to a report 
by the U.S. General Accounting Office, only ten percent of such funds 
manage to earn their expected return on their investment. See GAO REPORT, 
supra note 47, at 19 (citation omitted). According to Hsu and Kenney, VC 
has even been developed into an asset category, which is commonly 
acknowledged by large U.S. institutional and pension funds. Hsu & Kenney, 
supra note 219, at 1. 
221 See Ibrahim, supra note 197, at 720. 
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help the startup develop the company.222 Not only do VCs 
provide a startup (budding or unicorn) with cash,223 but also, 
and more importantly, the VC managers provide services such 
as mentoring to budding startups and networks of additional 
investors, potential acquirers, new partners and customers.224 
Founders, however, may worry about their ability to 
maintain control over the firm following new rounds of 
financing. The traditional pattern is that the founders get 
diluted and must give up voting control to secure more 
funding.225 If the VC has control over the board of directors, it 
can also fire the founders. In fact, Fried and Broughman show 
that the Mark Zuckerberg’s example (of a founder 
maintaining control after an IPO) is an exception and not the 
rule.226 Fried and Broughman challenge Black and Gilson’s 
traditional “call option on control” finance theory, which links 
VC and stock markets, and they further prove that the ex-ante 
likelihood of founders reacquiring control via IPO is extremely 
low.227  
Recent research further shows that there is an increase in 
the number of technology companies that decide to go public 
with dual class of share structures because their founders 
 
222 See DAN SENOR & SAUL SINGER, START-UP NATION: THE STORY OF 
ISRAEL’S ECONOMIC MIRACLE 161 (2009); see also Lindsey, supra note 50, at 
1137 (noting that venture capital firms add value by facilitating interaction 
within their networks); Ola Bengtsson & David H. Hsu, How Do Venture 
Capital Partners Match with Startup Founders? (Mar. 11, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript) (finding that founders seek VC partners with 
complementary experience), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1568131 [https://perma.cc/9HS3-9JJW]. 
223 SENOR & SINGER, supra note 222, at 161.  
224 See id.; Lindsey, supra note 50, at 1139 (discussing the value 
venture capitalists add by “helping firms to recruit key managers . . . 
monitoring and advising through service on the company’s Board of 
Directors . . . implementing other strong governance mechanisms . . . . [and] 
[f]acilitating strategic alliances[.]”). 
225 Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 
1998, https://hbr.org/1998/11/how-venture-capital-works [https://perma.cc/ 
999W-U7KR]. 
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want to avoid the pressures of short-termism and push to 
retain more influence over “their” firms, the management, and 
strategy.228  
Recent governance and share issuance strategies have also 
enabled some unicorn founders to maintain control over their 
company. Changes have been made to the traditional model of 
startup funding and the governance structures of VC-backed 
firms as founders of unicorn firms push to stay private longer 
and maintain control over the firm. Founders are able to do so 
by impeding a sale, where VC-investment rounds are 
structured as “friendly” financing rounds.  
As noted above, VC-backed startups in the United States 
have historically issued two classes of stock: common and 
preferred, which includes several series with new rounds of 
financing. New practices have altered the traditional model of 
financing and startup governance structure, which have in 
turn have provided founders with leverage in their 
negotiations with VCs (resulting in founder-friendly terms in 
formation and financing documents). 
Super-voting stock allows unicorn founders to maintain 
control over the company for a longer period of time as founder 
approval is needed for any future amendments of the charter 
(such amendments are required for most rounds of financings 
and approving liquidation events and sales.)229  
Unicorn founders wishing to use this structure will 
typically prepare the company’s formation documents to 
 
228 See Joann S. Lublin & Spencer E. Ante, A Fight in Silicon Valley: 
Founders Push for Control, WALL ST. J., (July 11, 2012), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303292204577519134168
240996 (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). According to 
Broughman and Fried, however, only fifteen percent of VC-backed IPOs 
from 2010 to 2012 were dual class. Broughman & Fried, supra note 167, at 
24 tbl.2. 
229 See Jonathan Axelrad, Founder Friendly Stock Alternatives I: 
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provide for two types of common stock (Classes A and B.)230 
Class B will carry multiple votes per share (such as ten to 
twenty) and will be granted to the founders.231 Class A will 
carry only one vote per share and will be reserved for issuance, 
under the unicorn’s stock option plan, to rank-and-file 
employees.232  
This structure is designed to give founders control over the 
company in their capacity as shareholders, even if their 
ownership stake is diluted in the future through additional 
rounds of financing. It should be noted that the founders will 
have to have leverage to negotiate this friendly-term with VCs 
and other investors in each rounds of financing. It is not 
guaranteed to last forever, even if included in formation 
documents.  
Super-voting stock at the board level is another use of 
common stock, which confers a multiple of votes for board 
seats (such as a multiple of two to five per vote) to its 
holder.233 This type of common stock gives founders the power 
to elect directors to the board and have control over the board’s 
major decisions.234 This structure can have adverse effects on 
the board’s ability to follow its fiduciary duties, but those 
issues fall outside the scope of this Article.  
FF preferred stock is a new type of common stock that does 
not have the traditional lock-in.235 It is issued to founders, like 
 
230 See id. 
231 See id. 
232 Facebook, Palantir, Snapchat, Uber, and Airbnb each issued two 
classes of common stock with the preferred class in each case carrying ten 
votes per share and the common stock carrying one. See Cytowski & 
Partners, The Anatomy of a Unicorn, MEDIUM (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@cytlaw/the-anatomy-of-a-unicorn-3298df383e03 
[https://perma.cc/35V7-3ZZX]; see also Caine Moss & Emma Mann-
Meginniss, 5 Founder-Friendly Financing Terms that Give Power to 
Entrepreneurs, VENTURE BEAT (Nov. 16, 2014), 
https://venturebeat.com/2014/11/16/5-founder-friendly-financing-terms-
that-give-power-to-entrepreneurs/ [https://perma.cc/Z5EA-BYF7]. 
233 See Moss & Mann-Meginniss, supra note 232. 
234 See id. 
235 See id. 
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common stock, but has a special conversion right that allows 
its holder to cash out prior to a traditional liquidity event such 
as an IPO or sale.236 The company will issue a portion of the 
founder’s equity in the form of FF preferred stock, and the rest 
in regular common stock.237 The FF preferred stock allows the 
founder to get liquidity with future VC investment.238 The VC 
can buy the FF preferred stock from the founder, and the FF 
preferred stock is then converted to the investor’s preferred 
stock.239 This practice can impact the company’s option plan 
(affect the price at which the options are issued,) and have 
adverse tax consequences for the founder and the company.240  
Typically, VCs negotiate for and get voting-control 
provisions, which give them voting blocks on liquidation and 
raising additional capital.241 By giving common stock holders 
the same voting-control provisions, unicorns give founders the 
freedom to dictate when and whether the company sells or 
raises capital.242 VCs will always negotiate for and receive 
some protections in their investment documents. If founders 
are able to negotiate for the same protections, then they will 
be able to limit the VC’s control over the decision to liquidate 
the company.243  
Founders are now also able to negotiate and receive 
aggressive founder vesting provisions.244 The traditional 
 
236 See id. 
237 See id. 
238 See id. 
239 See id. 
240 See id. 
241 See Trent Dykes, Financing Your Startup: Understanding Control 




242 See Moss & Mann-Meginniss, supra note 232. 
243 For example, Snapchat does not give its series C, D, E, or F preferred 
shareholders any voting rights or anti-dilution protection, “essentially 
allowing them to just invest and tag along for the ride.” Cytowski & 
Partners, supra note 232. 
244 See Moss & Mann-Meginniss, supra note 232. 
 
  
160 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
vesting schedule is four-year with a one-year cliff vesting.245  
Certain founders are negotiating for an accelerated vesting 
time frame of three years or less, sometimes without the cliff 
vesting.246 These terms for acceleration become effective in 
the event of a change of control provisions or involuntary 
terminations of the founders without cause.247   
These structures can, like super-voting stock at the board 
level, have adverse effects on the board’s fiduciary duties and 
can also subject the investors to a hold up and abuse by the 
founders. However, these issues are outside the scope of this 
Article.  
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Stock option plans and equity compensation agreements 
have been used by private companies for many years. Options 
were traditionally designed with a timeframe of four years to 
IPO or sale. Today, however, unicorns are staying private 
longer, and conducting an IPO or a sale much later: on 
average after eleven years, and, in many cases, not at all.248 
During this long period, there is always a chance that the 
value of the unicorn’s common stock will drop below the strike 
price, rendering the options practically worthless to their 
holder.  
Additionally, the unicorn’s valuation might fluctuate after 
the firm grants options to employees. These scenarios can lead 
to employees with out-of-the-money options. Because it is 
 
245 See id. 




247 See Moss & Mann-Meginniss, supra note 232. 
248 See Doidge et al., Eclipse of the Public Corporation, supra note 6; 
Gao et al., supra note 6; see also Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Offerings: 
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usually illegal to backdate employee options,249 unicorns will 
be compelled to re-issue options to employees in order to keep 
them motivated. Unicorn firms should experiment with 
revisions to traditional equity compensation plans in order to 
recreate the incentives and alignment of interests that were 
present before the new equilibrium.  
Start-ups can deal with the tax considerations and 
illiquidity of unicorn shares in several ways. Section IV.A 
presents the currently proposed alternatives to the traditional 
stock option plan (and employee contract), and critiques them. 
Section IV.B describes the present alternatives to the 
traditional liquidity mechanisms and discusses their pitfalls. 
Section IV.C proposes new disclosure requirements as an 
alternative route to fixing these issues.  
A. Contractual Alternatives  
Unicorn firms and the pool of employees are repeat players 
in aggressive technology markets. The unicorn employees are 
the intellectual “assets” of the firm, and the firm depends on 
their talent to innovate and grow. High turnover rates are 
therefore detrimental to a unicorn’s business model. The firm 
also cares a great deal about maintaining its reputation. 
Companies with a bad reputation will probably have a harder 
time attracting new talent, in such competitive markets.  
As discussed above, unicorn employees are increasingly 
discontent with their equity compensation because of extreme 
“lock-in” of their capital due to the illiquidity of their stock and 
the fact that founders, senior management, and some 
investors are not in a rush to do an IPO. Further, several 
recent changes to market dynamics and new market players 
(mutual funds and sovereign wealth funds) give unicorn 
founders (the common shareholders) greater power vis-à-vis 
preferred shareholders to impede a sale and keep the company 
private longer. All these factors contribute to the shift in 
employees’ expectations.  
 
249 See Jesse M. Fried, Option Backdating and Its Implications, 65 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 855 (2008). 
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The high-tech industry is plagued with uncertainty and 
information asymmetry, as discussed above.250 There is a 
view in finance and economics251 that contracts have limits 
and that reputational threats to parties serve as a disciplining 
device. According to incomplete contracting theory, the stock 
option plans and other equity compensation agreements 
between the unicorn firm and its employees are subject to 
renegotiation. A contract cannot prevent unforeseen 
contingencies that can trigger conflicts between the parties in 
the future.252 Renegotiation therefore is necessary because 
unicorn firms likely care about their reputation. Unicorn 
firms could also experiment with alternative contracting and 
organizational solutions to better monitor their labor force 
and deal with their employees’ public complaints.  
This Section raises the question of whether such 
renegotiations can reach optimal employee contract for the 
different types of unicorn employees, including rank and file, 
management, and founders. There are many problems that 
arise when designing employment contracts and aligning 
employee incentives. Several incentive problems are 
addressed in the following sections, including those created by 
preferred stock liquidation preferences (“overhang”)253 or by 
lack of liquidity. 
 
250 See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text. 
251 The principal-agent problem is an essential element of the 
“incomplete contracts” view of the firm. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion & Patrick 
Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 
REV. ECON. STUD. 473 (1992); R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 
ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation 
of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983); Stuart L. Hart, A 
Natural-Resource-Based View of the Firm, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 986 (1995); 
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 51; see also W. Bentley MacLeod, 
Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts 
(Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
1730, 2006), https://ssrn.com/abstract=885347 [https://perma.cc/843T-
XUQE]. 
252 See Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term 
Contracts, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 2005 (1987). 
253 Broughman & Fried, supra note 20, at 385.  
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Unicorn firms currently use (and will likely continue to 
use) equity compensation aggressively (including stock option 
or restricted stock units) to attract, engage, and retain talent. 
The following are some alternatives that are used to deal with 
the current issues that arise concerning incentive 
compensation for different kinds of employees, including those 
with options that are about to expire and others who wish to 
leave (triggering the ninety-day exercise window). 
This Section presents and critiques these alternatives, and 
make suggestions for the future. The suggestions are meant 
to allow employees to maintain their incentive compensation 
and perhaps defer their tax liability. They do not solve the 
liquidity problem, but liquidity is also discussed herein. 
1. Outright Stock Grants to Founders 
For founders, outright stock grants (instead of options) are 
typical and are usually issued at the formation stage of the 
business.254 The advantages of issuing outright stock to 
founders is that the stock is issued at a low price (as valuation 
of the company has yet to take off) and it gives them certain 
benefits of direct stock ownership. It also avoids some of the 
tax drawbacks of stock options.255  
As noted in Part III, the founders at unicorn firms are 
already capable of protecting their interests. Often, they are 
the ones who are pushing the companies to stay private 
longer. Accordingly, the equity compensation problems 
discussed herein are largely not relevant to unicorn founders. 
2. Section 83(i) Election for Early Employees 
Early employees who join a startup at the formation stages 
(pre-unicorn status) can make a section 83(i) election (which 
is analogous to the section 83(b) election) if all the 
 
254 See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S 
GUIDE TO LAW AND STRATEGY 96 (5th ed. 2018). 
255 Id. at 96. 
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requirements are met.256 These elections trigger the holding 
period, allowing employees to meet the requirements for long-
term capital gains rates. The election must be made no later 
than thirty days after the option exercise or restricted stock 
unit vesting date.  
While use of the section 83(i) election does not solve the 
illiquidity problem, it prevents early employees from carrying 
the excessive risk of paying large amounts of money out-of-
pocket for exercising and paying taxes for profit that might 
not materialize.257  
3. Extensions to Post Termination Exercise 
Periods  
As noted above, there is a heated debate in Silicon Valley 
over the fairness of the ninety-day stock option exercise period 
for departing employees.258 Ex-employees of unicorn firms 
complain that they helped build the unicorn, but after leaving 
the firm, cannot enjoy the fruits of their labor. Instead, they 
were faced with a dilemma—to exercise or forfeit? The 
 
256 On the section 83(b) election, see id. at 485; see also Ronald J. Gilson 
& David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax 
Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 894–95 
(2003); David I. Walker, The Non-Option: Understanding the Dearth of 
Discounted Employee Stock Options, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1505, 1556–57 (2009).  
257 See Bruce Brumberg, IRS Guidance on Private Company Grants of 
Stock Options and RSUs Provide Limited Support, FORBES (Dec. 10, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucebrumberg/2018/12/10/irs-guidance-on-
private-company-grants-of-stock-options-and-rsus-provides-limited-
support/#336702746eb9 [https://perma.cc/6JJS-7AWK]; J. Marc Fosse & 
Angel L. Garrett, Section 83(i) of the Internal Revenue Code – Qualified 
Equity Grant Programs Permit Employees to Elect to Defer Income Taxes on 





258 See, e.g., Dash Victor, Extending the Option Exercise Period — A 
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unicorns’ valuations are by definition very high, but some 
employees cannot afford to pay for the taxes and exercise 
price. Even if they were able to pay, the gain may never 
materialize if the company never goes public or its value 
declines below the strike price.259  
To deal with these complaints, several companies 
including Quora,260 Pinterest,261 and Coinbase,262 have made 
changes to their option plans, extending the exercise period 
for ex-employees to anywhere from one to ten-years.263  
There is a call in Silicon Valley for other unicorns to join 
these firms and extend their exercise periods.264 By extending 
post-termination exercise periods, companies would help 
encourage equality among unicorn employees. Ex-employees 
 
259 See Phil Haslett, Weekly Update #216: What the 90-Day Option 
Exercise Rule Means for Pre-IPO Secondaries, EQUITYZEN, 
https://equityzen.com/knowledge-center/newsletter/weekly-update-216/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y8J5-UTNP] (discussing layoffs); Connie Loizos, Dear 
Unicorn, Exit Please, TECHCRUNCH (July 23, 2015), 
https://techcrunch.com/2015/07/23/dear-unicorn-exit-please/ 
[https://perma.cc/DX8U-6TM2].  
260 Ed Zimmerman, Stock Options: VC-Backed Startups Extend Post-




261 See Lynda Galligan, Startups Take Note: Pinterest Will Allow Ex-
Employees to Keep Vested Stock Options for Seven Years, FOUNDERS 
WORKBENCH BLOG (Mar. 26, 2015), 
https://www.foundersworkbench.com/startups-take-note-pinterest-will-
allow-ex-employees-to-keep-vested-stock-options-for-seven-years/ 
[https://perma.cc/DB5D-LT4E] (noting that Pinterest granted a seven-year 
stock option extension for employees with at least two years of tenure at the 
company). 
262 See Brian Armstrong, Improving Equity Compensation at Coinbase, 
COINBASE BLOG (Aug. 5, 2015), https://blog.coinbase.com/improving-equity-
compensation-at-coinbase-8749979409c3 [https://perma.cc/LN6K-73E6]. 
263 See Victor, supra note 258.  
264 See Harj Taggar, Fixing the Inequity of Startup Equity, TRIPLEBYTE 
(Mar. 5, 2016), https://triplebyte.com/blog/fixing-the-inequity-of-startup-
equity [https://perma.cc/Z6GW-3PX4] (discussing a proposal by Y 
Combinator, a VC, calling for a ten-year rule). 
 
  
166 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
would be able to choose whether or not to exercise the options 
at a later date, taking into consideration liquidity events (such 
as an IPO) that make exercising worthwhile.265  
This call for a one-size-fits-all adoption of extended 
exercise windows is a flawed solution, though.266 The 
extension of exercise windows will benefit ex-employees (who 
are not contributing to the firm any longer), but will also be to 
the detriment of the current unicorn employees who are still 
contributing.267 In other words, an extended exercise window 
will cause a “direct wealth transfer”268 from the current 
employees, who choose to stay and contribute to the company’s 
growth, to ex-employees, who may even be working for a 
competitor.269 
Such a broad rule is detrimental to a firm’s ability to 
retain, engage and attract employees. If such a rule is 
adopted, employees are incentivized to diversify their 
investments by quitting their jobs immediately after receiving 
equity options. These incentives are exacerbated by the real 
risk that the unicorn will never IPO, will fail, or will enter into 
a trade sale. The employees will then join another tech 
company to get more options from the new employer, while 
maintaining a ten-year option to exercise from the previous 
employer, without contributing to the growth of the 
company.270  
Moreover, extending the exercise period may be 
cumbersome for companies, who will be required to keep track 
of a larger number of common shareholders. This concern is 
especially relevant when common shareholder approval is 
needed for authorization for certain actions, such as for 
 
265 Kupor, supra note 2. 
266 See Taggar, supra note 264.  
267 See Kupor, supra note 2. 
268 Irvin Chan developed a simple model of this wealth transfer. See id. 
His model shows that when ninety-day windows are extended to ten years, 
current employees suffer an eighty percent dilution, while former 
employees, who no longer contribute to the company’s growth, get to keep 
their options. See id. 
269 See id. 
270 See id. 
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issuance of new shares to existing or new employees, 
acquisitions, or raising capital. However, this approach may 
work better for the growing number of dual-class companies, 
in which founders retain some control even as the number of 
outstanding common shares grows. 
This practice will contribute to the existing problem of ex-
or current unicorn employees (and other investors), who turn 
to secondary markets for liquidity. Under federal securities 
laws, the sale on these platforms can be challenged if the 
seller failed to disclose all material information about the 
stock to the buyer. 
Finally, the differing tax treatment between ISOs and 
NSOs discussed earlier limits the efficacy of this proposal. 
From a tax implication perspective, ISOs receive better tax 
treatment, but according to the current tax code, ISOs that 
are not exercised within ninety-days of departure become 
NSOs.271 Extending the exercise period therefore undermines 
the benefits of ISOs’ more favorable tax treatment.272 
4. Back-End Loaded Stock Vesting  
Another suggestion that has been floated is issuing back-
end loaded stock options.273 This suggestion changes the 
traditional cliff vesting method to discourage employees from 
leaving the firm,274 and follows Snapchat’s example. Snapchat 
structured their vesting schedule so that employees vested ten 
percent after the first year, twenty percent after the second 
 
271 See supra Section II.A.2.  
272 See supra Section II.A.2.  
273 See Scott Kupor, Recommendations for Startup Employee Option 
Plans, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ (July 26, 2016), 
https://a16z.com/2016/07/26/options-plan/ [https://perma.cc/39LH-AMP9]. 
274 A clawback provision is usually added to employment contracts to 
control incentives and option payouts. If the performance, for example, 
should worsen, the clawback provision forces the employee to give a portion 
of the money back. If it is back-ended, the employee may end up with little 
equity if the company decides that she is not performing at the fourth year.  
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year, thirty percent after the third, and forty percent at the 
end of the fourth year.275  
Labor law considerations are significant for this practice 
because unicorns are private firms, and most of them are 
located in Silicon Valley.276 Therefore, California labor law 
will apply to companies and employees located in California, 
considering that “labor is one of two key inputs to the firm”.277  
Back-end loaded stock vesting therefore exposes the 
company to potential litigation for wrongful termination. One 
of the reasons for the traditional design of cliff vesting is to 
protect the company from “dead weight” lawsuits.278 
 
275 See Jason Nazar, The Complete Guide to Understanding Equity 
Compensation at Tech Companies, FORTUNE (Sept. 27, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/09/27/the-complete-guide-to-understanding-equity-
compensation-at-tech-companies/ [https://perma.cc/7YWJ-2UL6]; see also 
Kupor, supra note 273. 
276 Silicon Valley traditionally benefited from open labor markets and 
solid social networks, which drove entrepreneurship and experimentation. 
Yet, today, Silicon Valley is at the center of a diversifying network of 
economies and its status quo is changing, due to the openings of new 
markets, the emergence of new international relationships, transformation 
of the traditional startup financing model, and the rise of unicorn firms. See 
Annalee Saxenian, The New Argonauts, WORDS INTO ACTION: INT’L 
MONETARY FUND WORLD BANK GROUP BOARD OF GOVERNORS ANN. MEETINGS, 
Sept. 11–20, 2006, at 99, 109, https://vdocuments.site/anna-lee-saxenian-
the-new-argonauts.html [https://perma.cc/M2SE-3RT3]; see also ANNALEE 
SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS: REGIONAL ADVANTAGE IN A GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 37 (2006). 
277 On the intersection of labor and capital as two principal inputs to 
the firm, see Rock & Wachter, supra note 101, at 121; see also Edward B. 
Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms and 
the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001).  
278 With regards to “dead weight” lawsuits, the California Counsel 
Group notes:  
No one likes dead weight, especially in a startup. As the 
startup team continues to work hard creating value for the 
company, an absent founder can create morale and 
motivation issues among the rest of the team. 
Why should absent founders get to share in the 
potential upside of the company when they have stopped 
doing what they said that they would do to create value for 
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Generally, the employment at-will doctrine gives the company 
the power to discharge the employee anytime without 
cause.279 But certain states, including California, impose an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to even at-will 
arrangements.280 Employees who are not carrying their 
weight and are fired under the proposed arrangement can sue 
the company for wrongful termination, claiming that the 
company wrongfully discharged them to prevent a significant 
percentage of their options from vesting and thereby deprived 
them of benefits they had already “earned.”281 
5. Restricted Stock Units  
Many companies, including Uber, issue Restricted Stock 
Units (“RSU”s) once they reach the one-billion-dollar 
valuation threshold.282 RSUs are a company’s promise to pay 
a bonus in the form of shares or cash (in an amount equal to 
the value of the share) to an employee in the future.283 RSUs, 
like options, can be structured so that they vest over time once 
the conditions are satisfied.  
There are several advantages to using RSUs. First, RSUs 
are not as risky for employees; unlike options, RSUs have 
downside protection, because they do not have a strike 
 
the company? Put simply – they shouldn’t. And that’s why it 
is critical that each startup establish vesting arrangements 
among the founders from the start. 
Stock Vesting: How It Works and Why It Matters, CAL. COUNS. GROUP, 
https://calcounselgroup.com/2017/05/22/stock-vesting-how-it-works-and-
why-it-matters/ [https://perma.cc/AB5M-BEQK] (emphasis in original). 
279 See generally Wendy J. Hannum, Good Cause: California’s New 
Exception to the At-Will Employment Doctrine, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 263 
(1983). 
280 Id. 
281 See, e.g., Scully v. US WATS, Inc., 238 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2001).  
282 See AJ Frank, Don’t Let Recruiters Trick You (Or How to Evaluate 




283 BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 531.  
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price.284 Second, unlike options, RSUs will not be worthless as 
they are not subject to the unicorn stock price fluctuations. 
RSUs will always have value equal to the price of the stock 
regardless of when they were granted to employees. Third, 
granting RSUs helps the company mitigate the risk of 
employees trading on secondary markets, as RSUs cannot be 
sold prior to an IPO.285  
RSUs are a good solution for wealthy cash-hoarding 
unicorns, as opposed to cash-poor early startups, as the 
unicorn can pay the employee in cash or by stock upon 
vesting.286 Unlike the option, employees can hold on to the 
RSUs until they fully vest upon a liquidity event even if they 
already left the unicorn.287 
Although RSUs have greater downside risk protection, 
they have less upside potential. Employees will generally 
receive fewer RSUs for the same maturity because RSUs have 
value regardless of how well the issuing company performs 
after the grant. Additionally, according to section 409A of the 
Internal Revenue Code,288 RSUs are taxed as ordinary income 
when received, if the vesting conditions are satisfied. The 
employees only receive long-term capital gains tax treatment 
if they convert their RSUs to stock and hold the stock for more 
than twelve months. Additionally, as RSUs cannot be sold on 
a secondary market, they do not solve the illiquidity problem.  
 
284 See Jeron Paul, RSUs vs. Options: Why RSUs (Restricted Stock 
Units) Could Be Better Than Stock Options at Your Private Company, 
CAPSHARE BLOG (July 9, 2016), https://www.capshare.com/blog/rsus-vs-
options/ [http://perma.cc/F9H5-JTB4].  
285 See generally A Guide to Employee Liquidity Programs: Why and 
How Companies Align the Interests of All Parties, FOUNDERS CIRCLE, 
http://www.founderscircle.com/secondary-employee-aligned-liquidity-guide 
[https://perma.cc/U3PD-4RBW]. 
286 BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 531. 
287 RSUs are subject to section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code, and 
will be taxed as ordinary income, when the stock is received. BAGLEY & 
SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 531. 
288 I.R.C. § 409A (West 2017) (including deferred compensation under 
nonqualified deferred compensation plans in gross income). 
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B. Liquidity Alternatives  
Several alternative approaches have also been proposed to 
solve the illiquidity problem. These alternatives include direct 
listing, the use of electronic secondary markets, secondary 
sales to individual buyers, and efforts to allow employees to 
gain liquidity while letting founders maintain control289 over 
the management of their company.290 
1. Direct Listing  
Spotify, the Swedish music-streaming-technology unicorn, 
went public last year by launching a direct listing on the New 
 
289 See Nicolas Grabar, David Lopez & Andrea Basham, A Look Under 
the Hood of Spotify’s Direct Listing, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (Apr. 26, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/26/a-
look-under-the-hood-of-spotifys-direct-listing/ [http://perma.cc/BP3D-
S24B]. 
290 Before direct listing, tech founders typically used dual class stock. 
For more on dual class stock and “minority controlling shareholders” see 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-
Class Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 594–95 (2017) (“Furthermore, there has 
been an upward trend in the adoption of dual class stock since Google went 
public with a dual-class structure in 2004 and was followed by well-known 
tech companies, such as Facebook, Groupon, LinkedIn, Snap, Trip Advisor, 
and Zynga. Indeed, according to data-provider Dealogic, ‘[m]ore than 13.5 
percent of the 133 companies listing shares on United States exchanges in 
2015 have set up a dual-class structure . . . compare[d] with . . . just 1 
percent in 2005.’”). For a detailed account of the history of dual-class 
structures in the United States, see Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in 
Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 
54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 693–707 (1986). For new stock exchange rules 
authorizing dual class listings, see
 
Voting Rights, NYSE Listed Company 
Manual § 313.00 (2018) (permitting the issuance of multiple classes prior to 
the IPO); see also Nasdaq Stock Market Equity Rules § 5640, IM5640, 
Voting Rights Policy (2018); Press Release, Council of Institutional Inv’rs, 
Institutional Investors Oppose Stitch Fix Dual-Class Structure but 
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York Stock Exchange,291 in order to “directly match public 
buyers with private sellers.”292 The direct listing allows 
Spotify shareholders, investors, and employees to sell shares 
in the open public stock market.293 However, whether unicorn 
firms should follow Spotify and use direct listing to facilitate 
liquidity depends on the following questions: Did Spotify’s 
direct listing serve the interests of the employees and the 
firm?294 Did Spotify have an adequate price discovery process? 
These questions warrant further research. In addition, unlike 
a traditional IPO, direct listing has no book building, and the 
financial advisors do not facilitate price discovery (except on 
the opening price).295 It is unknown whether other unicorns 
will choose this strategy in the future.296 
2. Electronic Secondary Markets 
The current practice of trading unicorn stocks on electronic 
secondary markets increases liquidity for individual investors 
but raises several issues. Certain unicorns allow their 
employees and capital investors to sell their shares on 
 
291 See Spotify Case Study: Structuring and Executing a Direct Listing, 
LATHAM & WATKINS (June 21, 2018), https://www.lw.com/thought 
Leadershipspotify-case-study-structuring-executing-direct-listing 
[https://perma.cc/Y6BG-YTAS] (“Spotify Technology S.A. went public on 
April 3, 2018 through a direct listing of its shares on the New York Stock 
Exchange.”). 
292 See Samuelson, supra note 28 (“Achieving a high price was nice for 
the sellers. It wasn’t all that material for the company.”). 
293 Grabar et al., supra note 289 (“Spotify has one shareholder that has 
agreed with Spotify to hold onto its shares until 2020—the Chinese internet 
giant Tencent, which owns about 9%. The other shareholders have no 
similar limitations and no lock-ups.”). 
294 See id.  
295 See id. Traditionally, companies use book-building price discovery 
mechanism. Id. 
296 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Spotify Listing: Can an “Underwriter-
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secondary markets, using electronic platforms such as Nasdaq 
Private Market (formerly SecondMarket) and SharesPost.297  
On the one hand, the “direct market is improving the 
liquidity of start-up stock for locked-in investors by lowering 
these transaction costs.”298 On the other, these markets also 
expose non-accredited investors to risks and uncertainties, 
due to current contractual arrangements and securities and 
tax laws.299 
These platforms also raise other issues. First, unicorns are 
private and therefore their valuations are uncertain. For 
instance, a recent study by Gornall and Strabulaev finds huge 
discrepancies in the alleged worth of some unicorns, including 
Uber.300 Second, both the sellers of the shares (whether 
investors or employees) and the unicorn are subject to the risk 
of lawsuits by buyers, due to omissions and misstatements, 
under the securities law. Finally, unicorns are concerned that 
allowing employees to trade on these platforms will trigger 
public registration requirements under section 12(g). Finally, 
unicorns are concerned that extensive use of these platforms 
 
297 See Ibrahim, supra note 147, at 22. 
298 Id. 
299 See Adi Osovsky, The Curious Case of the Secondary Market with 
Respect to Investor Protection, 82 TENN. L. REV. 83, 130 (2014) (“[T]he 
democratization of Secondary Market transactions exposes non-accredited 
investors to new risks and uncertainties.”); see also Elizabeth Pollman, 
Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 182 (2012) 
(identifying and analyzing the information issues in the new online 
secondary markets).  
300 See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 176. The other restriction is 
with regards to companies that use the method of buybacks. “The deferral 
election is also not available if the issuing corporation bought back any 
outstanding stock in the preceding calendar year[.]” Lieberman, supra note 
32; see New Tax Act, supra note 80 (“The legislative history for the TCJA is 
silent on why Section 83(i) restricts share repurchases; however, a sponsor 
of the Empowering Employees through Stock Ownership Act, which is very 
similar to Section 83(i), described employee stock ownership as ‘a key tool 
for startups, allowing cash-poor innovators to recruit top talent.’”); see also 
Cable, supra note 5; Fan, supra note 5; Frier & Newcomer, supra note 8 
(“[I]nvestors agree to grant higher valuations, which help the companies 
with recruitment and building credibility[.]”). 
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and the related increase in their record shareholders would 
force them into an IPO.301 
3. Secondary Sale to a Single Buyer 
Unicorns are under pressure to seek liquidity. Therefore, 
in practice, many unicorns choose to facilitate a secondary 
sale of employees’ shares to a single buyer (or an existing 
shareholder), so that the sale does not violate section 12(g).302 
For example, on December 28, 2017, a number of Uber303 
shareholders, including Uber employees and early stage 
investors, were finally able to liquidate a portion of their 
shares via the tender offer of the Japanese technology 
conglomerate SoftBank.304 Just a few weeks earlier, news 
broke that Uber employees were lining up to sell their stock 
to SoftBank. Some of these employees had to take on loans to 
exercise their options because they could not sell their shares 
 
301 See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Keynote Address at the SEC-Rock 
Center on Corporate Governance Silicon Valley Initiative (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-silicon-valley-initiative-3-31-
16.html [https://perma.cc/ap47-xd3w]. 
302 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. 112-106 § 501, 126 
Stat. 306, 325 (2012). 
303 Griswold, supra note 33. 
304 See Katie Roof, SoftBank’s Big Investment in Uber Comes to a Close, 
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 28, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/28/softbanks-
big-investment-in-uber-comes-to-a-close/ [https://perma.cc/V3EC-74ZN]; 
see also Greg Bensinger & Liz Hoffman, SoftBank Succeeds in Tender Offer 
for Large Stake in Uber, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/softbank-succeeds-in-tender-offer-for-large-
stake-in-uber-1514483283 (on file with the Columbia Business Law 
Review); Lieberman, supra note 32 (“The new rule evolved from a 2016 
Senate bill sponsored by Senators Mark Warner and Dean Heller, the 
Empowering Employees Through Stock Ownership Act (SB3152), and a 
companion House bill (HR5719). The purpose was to provide an extended 
deferral period of up to seven years for employees who exercise options to 
buy the stock of private companies to ease the tax burden arising from 
equity grants covering shares that are not publicly traded.”). 
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in the open market.305 Luckily for these306 Uber employees 
and investors, the deal went through and the tender offer 
provided them with an opportunity to liquidate and recover 
their upfront investment.307 But what about all the other 
employees that were not permitted to participate, even on a 
pro rata basis? 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS  
In order to remove legal barriers to private ordering, this 
Article postulates that the current regulatory models need 
urgent amendments and comprehensive reform. The recent 
piecemeal amendments to the federal securities and tax laws 
do not solve the problems that unicorn firms are experiencing 
with attracting, engaging, and retaining talent. They also 
contribute to the unicorn employees’ conflict of expectations 
and, as a result, the unicorn firms continue to renegotiate 
labor contracts with their employees.  
 
305 New research studies examine the fair market value of startups 
worth over $1 billion. For instance, Gornall and Strebulaev find huge 
discrepancies in their purported worth. See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra 
note 176. On the skepticism about unicorn reported valuations, see also 
Robert P. Bartlett, III, A Founder’s Guide to Unicorn Creation: How 
Liquidation Preferences in M&A Transactions Affect Start-up Valuation, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 123 (Claire A. Hill & 
Steven David Solomon eds., 2016) (“[A]chieving unicorn status provides a 
firm with added visibility to prospective employees and customers, giving it 
a potential competitive advantage over rival firms.”); see also Cable, supra 
note 5; Fan, supra note 5; Frier & Newcomer, supra note 8 (“[I]nvestors 
agree to grant higher valuations, which help the companies with 
recruitment and building credibility”).  
306 Current Uber employees were only allowed to sell half of their stake 
in the company, whereas former employees had no restrictions. Griswold, 
supra note 33. 
307 See id. (“To qualify for the tender offer, participants must have at 
least 10,000 Uber shares and be ‘accredited investors,’ an SEC designation 
. . . for wealthy individuals.”); see Ilya Strebulaev, Fair Value of Uber 
Estimated at $49 Billion, LINKEDIN (Jan. 31, 2018), 
https://conferences.law.stanford.edu/vcs/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017 
/11/Fair-Value-of-Uber-Estimated-at-49-Billion-_-LinkedIn.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DM3J-HPU6]; see also Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 
176.  
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Specifically, with regard to the tax law, section 83 needs to 
be amended to address current issues that employees and 
firms are dealing with in these new market dynamics. 
Securities law needs more transparency and information. The 
first step in this direction is to amend the law to count the 
number of employees towards the threshold of registration 
with the SEC.  
A. Corporate Governance and Protection of Minority 
Shareholders  
Unicorns are private firms with concentrated ownership. 
Should the law provide additional protection to the employees 
as minority shareholders? If so, what kind of protections 
would help?  
It is necessary to protect unicorn employee-investors’ 
collective interests for the following reasons. First, the 
employees (other than founders and senior managers) who are 
granted equity compensation are usually minority 
shareholders, if they hold shares at all, limiting their ability 
to use their votes or voice to influence company actions. As 
noted above, they are locked-in and cannot easily redeem their 
investment.  
Second, the JOBS Act has extended the number of 
investors allowed in private companies before periodic reports 
are required under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.308 
The increase in the number of non-traditional investors may 
create collective action problems. Due to this increase, 
investors may tend to be more rationally apathetic.  
The intention and rationale behind the JOBS Act change 
is to facilitate emerging growth companies’ “access to the 
public capital markets.”309 One way the Act attempted to do 
 
308 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 
126 Stat. 306, 325 (2012). 
309 Rose & Solomon, supra note 163, at 84; see also Usha Rodrigues, 
Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389 (2013); Robert 
B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Rewarding the Public-Private 
Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573 
(2013); Usha Rodrigues, The JOBS Act at Work, CONGLOMERATE (Sept. 11, 
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so was by reducing some of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act regulatory 
requirements in the hope of encouraging private companies to 
go public.310  
The JOBS Act’s biggest achievement is “radical 
deregulation”311 by exempting more private firms from 
complying with the federal periodic disclosure 
requirements.312 U.S. firms have been subjected to these 
requirements since 1964.313 For example, as mentioned above, 
the JOBS Act changed the threshold that triggers registration 
with the SEC. Employees receiving equity grants no longer 
count as investors, and the number of accredited investors 
that necessitates certain public reporting increased from 500 
to 2,000.314  
 
2015), http://www.theconglomerate.org/jobs-act/ [https://perma.cc/6WZL-
NYGS] (criticizing the JOBS Act’s unrealistic endeavors to boost IPOs).  
310 See Solomon & Rose, supra note 163, at 3 (“The JOBS Act is 
primarily a response to the regulatory theory, but also takes some aims 
towards market structure by loosening restrictions on research analysts.”). 
311 See Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & 
Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 4–6 (2011) (statement of John Coates, Professor 
of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School) (noting that the provisions 
changing the shareholders of record trigger were “the most risky of the 
proposals” and provided an example of “radical deregulation”). Coates also 
suggested the need to use a better measure of share ownership than the 
increasingly antiquated concept of “record holders,” and offered as 
alternatives a firm’s public float or market valuation. Id.; see also Michael 
D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite 
the Rules That Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151, 
175 (2013).  
312 See Guttentag, supra note 311, at 152 (“Firms were first federally 
required to publicly disclose information on an ongoing basis with the 
passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934[.]”). 
313 For more on federal periodic disclosure requirements (“FDPRs") 
compliance and history, see id. at 153 (“After almost eighty years of federal 
rules requiring firms of various types to comply with FPDRs and a recently 
enacted substantial change to these rules, how best to determine when firms 
should be required to comply with these FPDRs still remains largely an 
enigma.”).  
314 See Garrett A. DeVries, SEC Approves Final Rules Implementing 
JOBS Act and FAST Act, AKIN GUMP (May 13, 2016), 
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Although the JOBS Act sought to boost the IPO market, it 
unfortunately leaves employees vulnerable as investors in 
their companies and subject them to the discretion of majority 
shareholders. Historically, according to Fan315 and Cable,316 
the securities laws were designed to protect employees. 
However, as a result of the deregulation efforts in the last few 
years, it is less likely that privately held unicorns will have to 
provide their employees with disclosure and information.317  
Other authors consider employees of startups as insiders 
(sometimes even as gamblers or lottery winners) who are well-





315 See Fan, supra note 5 (recommending that unicorn companies be 
subject to a scaled disclosure regime); see also Pollman, supra note 299 
(exploring the development of secondary markets for startup company stock 
and suggesting scaled disclosure requirements); Jeff Schwartz, The Law 
and Economics of Scaled Equity Market Regulation, 39 J. CORP. L. 347 
(2014) (outlining the costs and benefits of scaled regulation of large private 
companies); Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 531 (2012) (arguing for a “lifecycle model” of securities regulation that 
would adapt to firm age); Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 309 at 1625–
27 (calling for legislative reforms to reduce regulation for large private 
companies and advocates for enhanced regulation of broker-dealers as an 
alternative approach). 
316 Cable, supra note 5, at 616.  
317 See id. (“Private placement regulation, like other areas of law, 
traditionally viewed employees as vulnerable . . . . In recent decades, 
however, the [SEC] and Congress have essentially deregulated equity 
compensation by providing increasingly generous registration exemptions 
for equity grants to service providers. What is the basis for this policy 
change?”). 
318 For further discussion on employee incentives, see generally Robert 
Anderson IV, Employee Incentives and the Federal Securities Laws, 57 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1195 (2003) (discussing the status of employee options as 
securities); Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee 
Stock Options and Rule 10b-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2003) (focusing on the 
availability of Rule 10b-5 actions); Jensen & Murphy, supra note 14, at 138 
(advocating for equity compensation as a form of incentive-based executive 
pay); Smith, supra note 14 (focusing on the law and economics of equity 
compensation as private ordering). 
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Presumably their economic incentives are aligned with the 
those of the founders’. Moreover, employees are protected by 
investors, such as VC investors, who can sanction the 
founders for bad behavior. Even if this may be the case for 
employees of small or medium-sized startups, this is not true 
for unicorn employees who work for larger, quasi-public 
companies.319  
Third, mutual funds often have aggressive redemption 
rights.320 In the event that mutual fund investors exercise 
these rights, by asking to redeem their investment and cash 
out, the unicorn can face cash shortages and will most likely 
be compelled to raise new capital under unfavorable terms, if 
it is available at all. It is also very likely that the firm will go 
bankrupt. Although VCs sometimes also have redemption 
rights, they have rarely utilized them.321 Open-ended mutual 
funds may be more likely to demand redemption in a down 
market to raise the cash necessary to fund redemptions by 
their own shareholders. 
Finally, founders are sometimes able to control the board 
of directors with super voting rights or other arrangements, 
which enhance their power within the firm. It is also 
questionable whether the interests of all common 
shareholders are aligned. A university endowment fund may 
be a more patient investor than a cash-strapped individual 
trying to buy a house or fund a child’s education. 
Despite these issues, regulators and policymakers keep 
promulgating new regulations that enable companies to raise 
 
319 See Cable, supra note 5, at 616–17. 
320 Chernenko et al., supra note 4, at 32 (“Having to carefully manage 
their own liquidity, mutual funds require stronger redemption rights along 
both the intensive and extensive margins, suggesting contractual choices 
consistent with the funds’ reliance on redeemable funding.”). 
321 See Giulio Girardi, Christof W. Stahel & Youchang Wu, Cash 
Management and Extreme Liquidity Demand of Mutual Funds 1 (June 21, 
2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.sec.gov/files/DERA_ 
WP_Girardi-Stahel-Wu_Cash%20Management%20and%20Extreme%20 
Liquidity%20Demand.pdf (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
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large amounts of private capital.322 In fact, the SEC is 
working on new rules that are intended to open up private 
markets to non-accredited investors. One of the issues that 
the SEC will confront is whether unicorns “should have an 
easier way to compensate their workers by giving them stock 
in the company.” 323 
B. Reform to Recent Regulatory & Legislative 
Developments 
This Section provides examples of current legislation that 
are meant to continue to tie employees to these private 
companies, even though employees are experiencing liquidity 
challenges, their ownership is subject to forfeiture (in the 
event they leave the company), and their equity ownership 
does not typically come with voting or monitoring rights. 
Other means of averting knowledge leakage, such as non-
compete provisions, are not enforceable in California except in 
connection with the sale of an entire business.324 The 
illiquidity problem for unicorn shares has therefore affected 
the ability of startups to attract, retain, and engage talent. In 
order to continue to attract talent by providing equity 
 
322 The other legislation includes: (1) the Financial CHOICE Act of 
2017, which includes modernizing the Regulation D offering process and 
creates “venture exchanges;” and (2) crowdfunding regulations that were 
adopted by the SEC that allow companies to use a crowdfunding platform 
(as an intermediary) for raising small amounts of equity capital (less than 
$1 million dollars annually) from potentially large pools of investors over 
the internet. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection 
in the Crowdfunding Era: Disclosing to and for the “Crowd,” 38 VT. L. REV. 
827, 830 (2014). Regulation A+ of Title IV of the JOBS Act also increased 
the cap on a private company’s unregistered public offering to $50 million 
in any twelve-month period. However, companies raising capital under 
Regulation D can only accept investments from accredited investors and a 
limited number of non-accredited investors, whereas companies that use 
Regulation A+ are able to accept funds from the public in larger 
numbers, including from both accredited and non-accredited investors. See 
Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 309. 
323 See Michaels, supra note 17. 
324 See Lazonick, supra note 43.  
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compensation, various interest groups, including the National 
Venture Capital Association and unicorn founders, have been 
lobbying Congress for new laws and regulations.325  
1. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and 
Consumer Protection Act 
On May 24, 2018, President Trump signed into law the 
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer 
Protection Act (the “Economic Growth Act”).326 This act 
requires the SEC to amend Rule 701327 under Regulation D to 
increase, from $5 million to $10 million, the amount of 
securities that an eligible non-public company can offer or sell 
to employees for compensatory purposes (including stock 
options and restricted stock units) during a twelve-month 
period without having to register the securities under the 
Securities Act of 1933.328  
Although the SEC initially adopted Rule 701 in 1988 to 
promote entrepreneurship by reducing the securities-law 
compliance costs borne by small and medium-sized non-public 
 
325 Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, House Bill to Defer Tax 
Liability on Startup Stock Options Will Strengthen Entrepreneurial 
Ecosystem (Sep. 14, 2016), https://nvca.org/pressreleases/house-bill-defer-
tax-liability-startup-stock-options-will-strengthen-entrepreneurial-
ecosystem/ [https://perma.cc/J856-YWYC]. 
326 See Samuel R. Woodall III, Mitchell S. Eitel, Michael T. Escue, C. 
Andrew Gerlach, Camille L. Orme, Benjamin H. Weiner & Michael A. 
Wiseman, “Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection 
Act” is Enacted, PROGRAM ON CORP. COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT BLOG AT 
N.Y.U. SCH. OF L. (JUNE 5, 2018), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_ 
enforcement/2018/06/05/economic-growth-regulatory-relief-and-consumer-
protection-act-is-enacted/ [https://perma.cc/AKG9-VPTT].  
327 See Gary Shorter, Employee Ownership of Registration-Exempt 
Company Securities: Proposals to Reform Required Corporate Disclosures 
(Section 507 of S. 2155, S. 488, H.R. 1343, and Section 406 of H.R. 10), FED’N 
AM. SCIENTISTS (Apr. 3, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IN10680.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F422-CNEK].  
328 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (2018). 
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companies,329 the heightened threshold applies to unicorns 
and other large, privately held companies. 
By raising the employee sales cap to $10 million, Congress 
has encouraged employees to share in the ownership of even 
very large firms330 without requiring the companies to provide 
enhanced disclosure. This limits employees’ ability to make 
informed decisions about whether to exercise their options 
and buy illiquid unicorn stock. Unicorns that remain below 
the $10 million threshold are required to provide their 
employees only with a copy of the benefit plan (or 
compensatory contract) under which their securities were 
granted.331 If unicorns do not limit their employee offerings to 
come within the new $10 million threshold, then and only 
then, will they be required to provide their employees with 
detailed financial statements and risk factor disclosures.332  
The Economic Growth Act makes it easier for unicorn firms 
to stay private longer without addressing the illiquidity issues 
employees face when deciding whether to exercise employee 
stock options. Further, it leaves employees holding potentially 
tens of millions of dollars of illiquid stock at the mercy of the 
majority, without access to detailed financial statements or 
adequate disclosures of risks and prospectuses to help guide 
their investment decisions. This law encourages employees to 
 
329 Exempt Offerings Pursuant to Compensatory Arrangements, 83 
Fed. Reg. 34,940 (July 24, 2018). 
330 See DAVID W. PERKINS, DARRYL E. GETTER, MARC LABONTE, GARY 
SHORTER, EVA SU & N. ERIC WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45073, 
ECONOMIC GROWTH, REGULATORY RELIEF, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
(P.L. 115-174) AND SELECTED POLICY ISSUES (2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45073.pdf [https://perma.cc/AL32-8DLM]. 
331 See Erin Randolph-Williams, Alan Singer & Lauren E. Sullivan, 
Major Change in Rule 701 Disclosure Requirements, MORGAN LEWIS 
BLOG (June 21, 2018), https://www.morganlewis.com/blogs/mlbenebits/ 
2018/06/major-change-in-rule-701-disclosure-requirements 
[https://perma.cc/4SVC-D8VH]; Shorter, supra note 327. 
332 For purposes of Rule 701’s limitations on sales and the enhanced 
disclosure threshold, a sale is deemed to occur at the time of the grant of a 
stock option rather than at the time of exercise of the option. See Randolph-
Williams et al., supra note 331. 
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accept their firm’s stock rather than diversify their 
investments.333 
The purpose of the recent amendments to the securities 
laws was to give young startup companies time to mature and 
become more attractive as IPO candidates. Unfortunately, 
these amendments also created a problem for the firms and 
their employees. They did not take into account that employee 
stock options expire during this period.  
i. Mandatory Disclosure Requirements  
One of the main problems with unicorn employee stock 
option plans is that employees are uninformed about their 
rights and the status of the company. In order to make an 
investment decision to exercise or forfeit their options, they 
need information.334 Unicorn firms rely on the exemption 
under Rule 701 to not provide employees with enhanced 
disclosure. This must change.335 These firms must provide 
employees with enhanced information, especially concerning 
the risks associated with investing in illiquid securities of a 
high-risk venture that is often controlled by founders who lack 
 
333 See Legislative Proposals to Enhance Capital Formation and Reduce 
Regulatory Burdens, Part II, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. 
and Gov’t Sponsored Enters., H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. 22 
(2015) (statement of Mercer E. Bullard, President and Founder, Fund 
Democracy, Inc. and MDLA Distinguished Lecturer and Professor of Law, 
University of Mississippi School of Law), https://financialservices.house. 
gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-114-ba16-wstate-mbullard-20150513.pdf (on file 
with the Columbia Business Law Review) (“Rule 701 offerings should 
‘encourage’ offerings that actually increase the number of employees who 
own company stock while ‘discouraging’ offerings that result in 
overconcentration in the percentage of employees’ portfolios invested in 
company stock. The Encouraging Employee Ownership Act does precisely 
the opposite.”). 
334 The U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that employee status, taken 
alone, does not guarantee access to material information. SEC v. Ralston 
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953). 
335 See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION 23 
(2008). The purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 is “[t]o provide full and fair 
disclosure of the character of securities sold.” Id. 
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management experience.336 At least some level of disclosure 
(or a fairness hearing conducted under a new federal provision 
akin to section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933) should be 
mandated, and could perhaps be included in state blue sky 
laws.337 This would most likely require tweaks to federal law 
to avoid federal preemption, but to avoid an overly onerous 
process, the state and federal laws could be amended to permit 
those states with at least a designated percentage of the 
employees (perhaps thirty-three percent) to require disclosure 
or a fairness hearing. Further, only firms with outstanding 
equity issued for at least a specified amount (perhaps $200 
million) should be subject to the highest level of disclosure. 
In order to mitigate some of the risks that are associated 
with their employees’ investment, the mandatory disclosures 
should include the following information to employees. First, 
in addition to the stock option purchase agreement and plan, 
the firm should provide a schedule with the amount of capital 
that was raised by the company prior to that point. The 
schedule should include a list of investors that received 
liquidation preferences, and founders that were granted super 
voting common stock.  
 
336 See Eric Newcomer & Joel Rosenblatt, Here’s the Uber Investor Letter 




337 The California Corporations Code gives the Commissioner of 
Corporations the authority to conduct such hearings in the case of securities 
issuances in connection with mergers and other business combinations. See 
Corporations Fairness Hearings, CAL. DEP’T OF BUS. OVERSIGHT, 
http://www.dbo.ca.gov/ENF/FairnessHearings/Default.asp 
[https://perma.cc/DJ8R-L9MZ](“California Corporations Code section 
25142 allows companies interested in issuing securities in a merger or 
conducting an exchange of outstanding securities to seek a ‘fairness’ hearing 
as part of its application for qualification of the offer and sale of securities. 
By this process, applicants may seek an exemption from federal registration 
as provided by Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of 1933 through a state-
law hearing on the fairness of the terms and conditions of the proposed 
issuance or exchange of securities.”). 
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Second, the firm should disclose to employees how much 
debt it has accumulated, including debt evidenced by 
convertible or SAFE notes. Third, if companies allow 
employees to trade on secondary platforms, the companies 
should provide appropriate disclosures, including any 
restrictions on resale, to make sure that employees 
understand and comply with the applicable securities 
regulations. If the companies do not allow employees to trade 
on secondary platforms, they should consider facilitating 
private secondary market sales or stock buybacks to provide 
liquidity.338  
Fourth, disclosure should include information on the 
composition and compensation of the management team, 
information concerning current and future stock and debt 
issuances, a list of investors holding more than a specified 
percentage (perhaps one percent) of the outstanding stock 
(including their liquidation preferences and conversion 
rights), and a quarterly estimated fair market value of the 
stock. They should also provide employees with the assistance 
of an experienced and independent purchaser representative.  
Finally, unicorns should be required to be audited by an 
independent auditor before issuing equity compensation to 
unaccredited or unsophisticated purchasers above a stated 
threshold amount. If a company is raising money at a billion-
dollar valuation, the cost of such an audit should not be overly 
burdensome. The employees granted equity compensation 
should have access to and be entitled to rely on these reports.  
These disclosures can improve efficiency and reduce 
information asymmetries, and produce increasingly equitable 
and sustainable employee participation in unicorn companies.  
 
338 See Ric Marshall, Panos Seretis & Agnes Grunfeld, Taking Stock: 
Share Buybacks and Shareholder Value, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 19, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard. 
edu/2018/08/19/taking-stock-share-buybacks-and-shareholder-value/ (on 
file with the Columbia Business Law Review) (finding no compelling 
evidence of a negative impact from share buybacks on long-term value 
creation for investors overall). 
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ii. Naïve Employees 
Rule 701 was intended for small businesses and not large, 
cash-hoarding unicorns. Rank-and-file employees might be 
naïve investors,339 and, although they are insiders in the firm, 
they will need to decide whether to exercise or forfeit their 
options without a guarantee that there will be an IPO in the 
future. Additionally, most employees would not be able to 
bargain away from the predominant practice of equity 
incentive plans, because to do so might send a hostile signal 
to the market and to their employer, which they would like to 
avoid.340  
Perhaps the approach should go even further, and require 
that unicorns adhere to the same financial disclosure 
requirements as public companies. Mandating such 
disclosure might encourage unicorns to do an IPO, as they will 
be required to incur the expenses and disclosure obligations of 
public companies. Facebook, for example, did an IPO because 
it had reached the maximum threshold of shareholders of 
record (then 500) and thus was forced to become a “reporting” 
company under section 12(g) of the 1934 Act.341 Once 
Facebook was required to adhere to these financial disclosure 
requirements, the downsides of an IPO were limited, and the 
company went public.  
 
339 For more on naïve employees, see Ryan Bubb, Patrick Corrigan & 
Patrick L. Warren, A Behavioral Contract Theory Perspective on Retirement 
Savings, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1317, 1323 (2015), who criticize federal 
retirement plans policy. They postulate that employees are naïve and the 
current structure of the labor market gives employers strong incentives to 
offer matching contributions that exploit the employees. See id. 
340 See Rock & Wachter, supra note 101.  
341 See Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital 
Formation: Hearing Before the Securities and Exchange Commission (2011) 
(Capital Formation, Job Creation and Congress: Private Versus Public 
Markets, statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, 
Columbia University Law School, and Director of its Center on Corporate 
Governance), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/sbforum111711-materials-
coffee.pdf [https://perma.cc/PTY2-V2D7].  
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2. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act  
The National Venture Capital Association and the 
company Palantir Technologies (a well-known Silicon Valley 
data analytics unicorn)342 registered to lobby Congress on 
both the House and Senate versions of the Empowering 
Employees Through Stock Ownership Act.343 The new Tax Act 
incorporated certain sections from both versions of this act. 
The purpose of these changes was to encourage broad based 
equity compensation, incentivize employees to take an 
ownership stake in their firms by providing an extended 
deferral period, and allow startups to continue to use options 
as a tool to attract, retain and engage talent.  
One important change in the new Tax Act was in the new 
Internal Revenue Code section 83(i), which allows individuals, 
if certain conditions are met (such as the underlying stock is 
 
342 Palantir is a data analytics unicorn that got an early investment (in 
2005) from In-Q-Tel, the CIA’s venture capital arm. See William Alden, 
Palantir’s Relationship with America’s Spies Has Been Worse than You’d 
Think, CNBC (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/21/buzzfeed-
palantir-loses-relationship-with-nsa-ceo-karp-bashes-trump.html (on file 
with the Columbia Business Law Review); see also Paul Szoldra, 14 Cutting 
Edge Firms Funded by the CIA, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 21, 2016), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/companies-funded-by-cia-2016-9 
[https://perma.cc/29FT-SA72]. For more on In-Q-Tel, see Anat Alon-Beck, 
The Coalition Model, a Private-Public Strategic Innovation Policy Model for 
Encouraging Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth in the Era of New 
Economic Challenges, 17 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 267, 300–01 
(2018). During the time of its establishment, the idea of a government-
funded venture capital firm was entirely novel. See Steve Henn, In-Q-Tel: 
The CIA’s Tax-Funded Player In Silicon Valley, NPR (July 16, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2012/07/16/156839153/in-q-tel-
the-cias-tax-funded-player-in-silicon-valley [https://perma.cc/8SPA-G52K] 
(“Much of the touch-screen technology used now in iPads and other things 
came out of various companies that In-Q-Tel identified.”); see also JOSH 
LERNER, BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS 176 (2012) (“[T]he challenges of 
breaking into government procurements were daunting.”); see also Palantir 
Technologies, CB INSIGHTS, https://www.cbinsights.com/company/palantir-
technologies [http://perma.cc/T6EN-JF37]. 
343 See McKenna, supra note 181. 
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eligible stock and the corporation is an eligible corporation),344 
to defer tax liability on the income earned from exercising 
options (or settlement of RSUs) for up to five years.345 This 
intended to mitigate the problem described above concerning 
NSOs (and RSUs). Once employees exercise their options (or 
settle their RSUs), they have to pay tax immediately on profit 
that might never materialize. Employees have to pay out of 
pocket for both the strike price and the tax, and some 
employees might not be able to raise enough cash to pay for 
these expenses due to their firms’ high valuations.346  
 
344 The conditions include: (1) the underlying stock must be eligible 
stock; and (2) the corporation must be an eligible corporation. “The new rule 
evolved from a 2016 Senate bill, sponsored by Senators Mark Warner and 
Dean Heller, the Empowering Employees Through Stock Ownership Act 
(SB3152), and a companion House bill (HR5719).” Lieberman, supra note 
32.  
345 If an employee with ISOs will choose to make a section 83(i) election, 
it will negate the preferential tax treatment, and will convert the ISO to an 
NSO. Id. The other restriction is with regards to companies that use the 
method of buybacks. 
The deferral election is also not available if the issuing 
corporation bought back any outstanding stock in the 
preceding calendar year, unless not less than 25% of the 
total amount the company bought back is stock for which a 
Section 83(i) deferral election is in effect and the buyback’s 
eligibility criteria are made on a reasonable (non-
discretionary) basis. 
Id. 
346 See Practical Implications of Section 83(i) Option and RSU Tax 
Deferral, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI (June 19, 2018), 
https://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PD
FSearch/wsgralert-section-83i.htm [https://perma.cc/52MC-DGL2]. 
Exercising incentive stock options can trigger the alternative minimum tax. 
See Fundamentals of Equity Compensation, PAYSA, 
https://www.paysa.com/resources/fundamentals-of-equity-compensation 
[https://perma.cc/DKW3-X9J8]. Although Congress did not repeal the 
alternative minimum tax, it significantly increased the income exemption 
and phase-out amounts, leaving fewer startup employees who receive stock 
options subject to the tax. See Six Ways Tax Reform Affects Your Stock 
Compensation and Financial Planning, MYSTOCKOPTIONS.COM, 
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As noted above, some unicorns allow their employees to sell 
the share on secondary market platforms,347 but this 
approach is not efficient. Section 83(i) discourages this 
practice, and a unicorn that allows its employees to trade on 
a secondary market platform will not be able to use this new 
deferral.348  
Section 83(i) is also not applicable to early employees who 
made a section 83(b) election.349 As a result, early startup 
employees are often chained by golden handcuffs, and it is 
possible that many of them started working for the startup 
without knowing that it would turn into a unicorn. Many 
startups encourage early employees to make an 83(b) 
election., which allows employees to exercise their options 
before they are vested, so that they can pay taxes before the 
vesting date, when the stock has not appreciated yet.350 
Time and future Treasury Department regulations will tell 
whether this change will make it easier for unicorn employers 
to continue to use equity compensation plans as a retention 
tool. There are several issues that need to be clarified. For 
example, according to the current statutory language, it is not 
clear if the five-year period begins from the vesting or exercise 
date. Additionally, the section requires companies to 
determine and monitor the eligibility of their employees (and 




347 See Eliot Brown & Greg Bensinger, The Latest Path to Silicon Valley 
Riches: Stake Sales, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/investment-firms-buy-stock-in-startups-long-before-ipos-
1511045818 (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
348 See New Tax Act, supra note 80 (“The drafters of the bill may have 
thought that companies that have enough cash to repurchase shares should 
have enough cash to net settle employee stock options and RSUs and 
therefore should not be the beneficiaries of a tax deferral opportunity for 
‘cash-poor innovators.’”)  
349 See Practical Implications of Section 83(i) Option and RSU Tax 
Deferral, supra note 346; see also Fosse & Garrett, supra note 257. 
350 See New Tax Act, supra note 80. 
351 See New Tax Act, supra note 80. 
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There is a need for guidance on whether or not unicorn 
employees that trade on secondary markets can use section 
83(i). Currently, companies with stock traded on an 
“established securities market” cannot use this new section, 
and practitioners interpret this limitation to include 
secondary markets.352 
One of the main requirements is that the company must 
offer the options (or RSUs) to eighty percent of its 
employees.353 Some companies might not use it, as it broadens 
their shareholder base. Moreover, companies also have to 
comply with other existing U.S. federal and state “blue sky” 
securities laws, which might preclude companies from using 
such broad-based issuance of options or RSUs to employees.  
Section 83(i) also restricts two recent practices that allow 
private companies to give a temporary liquidity event to 
employees. It restricts a company’s ability to do a stock 
repurchase, and it does not allow employees to sell on 
secondary market platforms, in the previous calendar year.  
Section 83(i) allows some employees to defer some of the 
tax liability for up to five years, but it does not solve the urgent 
need for liquidity. There are several problems that can arise 
after an employee makes the deferral. First, if after five years, 
there is no imminent liquidity event and the company elects 
to stay private longer, the employee is again faced with a 
dilemma—to forfeit or to exercise? Employees again will have 
to pay the taxes in cash without knowing whether the imputed 
gain will ultimately be realized. Second, if, after the deferral, 
there is a loss (because the value of the stock has diminished), 
the employee is still obligated to pay taxes on the exercise or 
vesting.  
 
352 See Lydia O’Neal, New Tax Law’s Equity Grant Rule Not Too Useful 
for Startups, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.bna.com/new-
tax-laws-n73014474870/ [https://perma.cc/NV5R -WE89].  
353 See New Tax Act, supra note 80. 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
In the new economy, knowledgeable employees are 
incredibly important to the firm, as their knowledge 
contributes to the firm’s intangible assets.354 To attract, 
engage, and retain talent, unicorn firms must find ways to 
continue to offer employees equity (and a promise of equity) 
and facilitate liquidity opportunities.  
There are legal barriers to private ordering, which 
preclude unicorn firms from using traditional employee stock 
option plans. The recent piecemeal amendments to the federal 
securities and tax laws, which attempted to remove these 
barriers, have not been beneficial and have contributed to the 
issues that were raised herein. A comprehensive regulatory 
and legislative reform is needed. Finally, by providing 
employees with liquidity and adequate disclosures that can 
improve efficiency and reduce information asymmetries, 
unicorns, as well as their managers and boards, will reduce 
the likelihood of massive fraud. Liquidity opportunities and 
information will encourage employees to continue to exchange 
their creativity and hard work for the equity needed for the 
game-changing innovations necessary for American 
competitiveness in the global marketplace.355 
 
354 For example, the intangible assets can take the form of a patent, a 
trade secret, or a list of customers. See DELONG, supra note 58, at 7. (“Much 
of the capital value of the company may reside in the brains of the workers, 
not in identifiable physical capital.”). 
355 As so aptly put in Basic v. Levinson, “Who would knowingly throw 
the dice in a crooked crap game?” 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).  
